

Advanced Type Systems, Lecture I

The Boolean Model of Type Theory

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Introduction

Motivation: Relating type theory with set theory by translating the former into the latter:

Type Theory [1970's] \longleftrightarrow ZFC [1913]

- We will focus on the Calculus of Constructions with universes ($CC\omega$) [Luo 1984], i.e. Coq's formalism (CIC) without any inductive datatypes

- We will build a model of $CC\omega$ into ZFC (+ some extra axiom) such that:
 - propositions are interpreted as **booleans** (classical interpretation)
 - **typing relation** is interpreted as **membership** (**validity**, or **soundness**)

- Thanks to the **soundness** property, we will deduce:

- the logical **consistency** of $CC\omega$ (without assuming the SN property)
- the consistency of some usual axioms (excluded middle, axiom of choice, etc.)

What is $CC\omega$?

- The Calculus of Constructions with universes is:
The Calculus of Constructions, based on sorts $Prop, Type$
 - + infinitely many **predicative universes** $Type_i, i \geq 1$ (with $Type_1 = Type$)
 - + **cumulative rules** to enforce $Prop \subset Type_1, Type_i \subset Type_{i+1}$(but no inductive datatypes)
- The intended use of $CC\omega$ is slightly different from that of CC:
 - Prop is reserved for **propositions**
 - **datatypes** are put in the $Type_i$'s (universes \Rightarrow **predicative polymorphism**)[in CC, Prop is used both for datatypes and propositions]
- This set-theoretic model can also interpret **inductive datatypes, fixpoints, cases**...
 - ... but **not the impredicative sort Set** of Coq (non-conservative extension)

A formal presentation of CC_ω

Sorts	$s ::= \text{Prop} \mid \text{Type}_i \quad (i \geq 1)$
Terms	$M, N, T, U ::= x \mid s \mid \Pi x : T. U \mid \lambda x : T. M \mid MN$
Contexts	$\Gamma, \Delta ::= [] \mid \Gamma; [x : T]$
Judgments	$\Gamma \vdash$ $\Gamma \vdash M : T$ ' Γ is a well-formed context' 'under Γ , the term M has type T '
Reduction	$(\lambda x : T. M) N \rightarrow_\beta M\{x := N\}$
Notations	$FV(M)$ (free variables), $DV(\Gamma)$ (declared variables), $M\{x := N\}$ (external substitution), $M_1 =_\beta M_2$ (β -conversion)

Typing rules (1/2)

	$\frac{\Gamma \vdash M \vdash \Pi : T \cdot U \quad \Gamma \vdash N \vdash \{N =: x\} \cup : N \vdash \Gamma}{\Gamma \vdash M \vdash \Pi : T \cdot U \quad \Gamma \vdash N \vdash \Gamma}$	(App)
	$\frac{\Gamma \vdash \lambda x : T \cdot U \quad \Gamma \vdash M \vdash \Pi : T \cdot U}{\Gamma \vdash [x : T] \vdash M \vdash \Pi : T \cdot U \quad \Gamma \vdash s : U \cdot T \cdot U}$	(Lam)
	$\frac{\Gamma \vdash \text{Prop} : \text{Type}_1 \quad \Gamma \vdash \text{Type}_i : \text{Type}_{i+1}}{\Gamma \vdash}$	(Sort)
(x:T) ∈ Γ	$\frac{\Gamma \vdash x : T}{\Gamma \vdash}$	(Var)
(x ∉ DV(Γ))	$\frac{\Gamma \vdash [x : T] \vdash}{\Gamma \vdash T : s}$	(Context)

Typing rules (2/2)

$$\text{II(Prop, Prop)} \quad \frac{\Gamma \vdash T : \text{Prop} \quad \Gamma; [x : T] \vdash U : \text{Prop}}{\Gamma \vdash T : \text{Prop} \quad \Gamma; [x : T] \vdash U : \text{Prop}} \quad \Gamma \vdash \text{II}x : T . U : \text{Prop}$$

$$\text{II(Type}_i, \text{Type}_i) \quad \frac{\Gamma \vdash T : \text{Type}_i \quad \Gamma; [x : T] \vdash U : \text{Type}_i}{\Gamma \vdash T : \text{Type}_i \quad \Gamma; [x : T] \vdash U : \text{Type}_i} \quad \Gamma \vdash \text{II}x : T . U : \text{Type}_i$$

$$\text{II(Type}_i, \text{Prop)} \quad \frac{\Gamma \vdash T : \text{Type}_i \quad \Gamma; [x : T] \vdash U : \text{Prop}}{\Gamma \vdash T : \text{Type}_i \quad \Gamma; [x : T] \vdash U : \text{Prop}} \quad \Gamma \vdash \text{II}x : T . U : \text{Prop}$$

$$\text{(Conv)} \quad \frac{\Gamma \vdash M : T \quad \Gamma \vdash T' : s}{\Gamma \vdash M : T'}$$

$T =_{\beta} T'$

$$\text{(Cum)} \quad \frac{\Gamma \vdash T : \text{Prop} \quad \Gamma \vdash T : \text{Type}_i}{\Gamma \vdash T : \text{Type}_{i+1}}$$

A remark about dependent products

In this presentation, dependent products are introduced by the only rules

$(\text{Prop}, \text{Prop})$, $(\text{Type}_i, \text{Type}_i)$ and $(\text{Type}_i, \text{Prop})$.

But thanks to the cumulativity rules, we get two additional Π -rules for free:

$(\text{Type}_i, \text{Type}_j, \text{Type}_{\max(i,j)})$ and $(\text{Prop}, \text{Type}_i)$

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash T : \text{Type}_i \quad \vdots^{(\text{Cum})} \quad \Gamma; [x : T] \vdash U : \text{Type}_j}{\Gamma; [x : T] \vdash U : \text{Type}_j} \quad \frac{\Gamma \vdash T : \text{Type}_{\max(i,j)} \quad \Gamma; [x : T] \vdash U : \text{Type}_{\max(i,j)}}{\Gamma \vdash \Pi x : T. U : \text{Type}_{\max(i,j)}}$$

(same idea for $(\text{Prop}, \text{Type}_i)$)

Properties of $C\omega$

- **Syntactical properties:**
 - substitutivity, weakening, strengthening, β -subject reduction
 - **principal type**, up to β -conversion (no unicity, due to cumulativity)

- **Semantical properties:**

- (1) **consistency** (i.e. no proof of $\Pi A : \text{Prop} \cdot A$)
- (2) **strong normalization** (for well-typed terms)

In the following, we will assume neither (1) nor (2), because:

- (1) is precisely what we want to prove, without using (2)
 - (2) is at least as complex as (1) (and in fact, much more difficult)
- \Rightarrow combines all the ingredients of (1) + reducibility techniques

Expressivity

$\mathcal{C}\omega$ is a very expressive formalism in which we can define:

- Intuitionistic connectives

$$\begin{array}{lcl}
 \perp & \equiv & \text{Prop} \cdot X \\
 \top & \equiv & \text{Prop} \cdot X \rightarrow X \\
 A \wedge B & \equiv & \text{Prop} \cdot (A \rightarrow B \rightarrow X) \rightarrow X \\
 A \vee B & \equiv & \text{Prop} \cdot (A \rightarrow X) \rightarrow (B \rightarrow X) \rightarrow X \\
 A \Rightarrow B & \equiv & A \rightarrow B
 \end{array}$$

- Quantifiers, Leibniz equality

$$\begin{array}{lcl}
 \forall x : T . A(x) & \equiv & \text{Prop} \cdot A(x) \\
 \exists x : T . A(x) & \equiv & \text{Prop} \cdot (\text{Prop} \cdot A(x) \rightarrow X) \rightarrow X \\
 M_1 =^T M_2 & \equiv & \text{Prop} \cdot (T \rightarrow \text{Prop}) \cdot P M_1 \rightarrow P M_2
 \end{array}$$

- Natural numbers (in Type_2), and even Zermelo's set theory (intuitionistic fragment)

Set-theoretic model (big picture)

Idea: use the following dictionary to translate each term M (of $\mathcal{C}\omega$) as a set $\llbracket M \rrbracket$ in order to ensure the **soundness** property:

if $M : T$ is **derivable** (in $\mathcal{C}\omega$)

then

$\llbracket M \rrbracket \in \llbracket T \rrbracket$ is **provable** (in set theory)

Type theory	$\lambda x : T . M_x$ MN $\Pi x : T . U_x$
Set theory	$(x \in T \mapsto M_x)$ $M(N)$ $\prod_{x \in T} U_x$ \mathcal{U}_i (i th ZF-universe) $\{0; 1\}$ (booleans)

Thanks to this property, we will be able to reduce the question

Does the falsity $\Pi A : \text{Prop} . A$ have an inhabitant (in the empty context) ?

to the question

Does the empty set \emptyset have an element ? (since $\llbracket \Pi A : \text{Prop} . A \rrbracket = \emptyset$)

Functions in set theory

- A set f is a **function** if
 1. f is a set of pairs
 2. $\forall x, y, y' (x, y) \in f \wedge (x, y') \in f \Rightarrow y = y'$
- If f is a function, then
$$\text{Dom}(f) \triangleq \{x; \exists y (x, y) \in f\}$$
$$\text{Ran}(f) \triangleq \{y; \exists x (x, y) \in f\}$$

Abstraction: if D is a set, and if $H[x]$ is an expression depending on x , then

$$x \in D \mapsto H[x] \triangleq \{(x, H[x]); x \in D\}$$

Application: if $x \in \text{Dom}(f)$, then $f(x) \triangleq$ the unique y s.t. $(x, y) \in f$

Dependent products in set theory

- If A is a set, and if $(B_x)_{x \in A}$ is a family of sets indexed by A , then

$$\prod_{x \in A} B_x \stackrel{\Delta}{=} \{ f \text{ function; } \text{Dom}(f) = A \ \wedge \ \forall x \in A \ f(x) \in B_x \}$$

- Non-dependent case: $\prod_{x \in A} B = A \rightarrow B$ (also denoted B^A)

- The set-theoretical equivalents of typing rules (Lam) and (App) are:

$$\frac{\forall x \in A \ E[x] \in B_x \quad (x \in A \mapsto E[x]) \in \prod_{x \in A} B_x}{f \in \prod_{x \in A} B_x \quad a \in A \quad f(a) \in B_a}$$

(In set-theory, they are not 'rules' but theorems.)

Interpreting predicative universes

To interpret the universe hierarchy $(\text{Type}_i)_{i \geq 1}$, we want a family of sets $(\mathcal{U}_i)_{i \geq 1}$ such that:

(1) $\mathcal{U}_i \in \mathcal{U}_{i+1}$ (to interpret the axiom $\text{Type}_i : \text{Type}_{i+1}$)

(2) $\mathcal{U}_i \subset \mathcal{U}_{i+1}$ (to interpret cumlativity)

(3) Each \mathcal{U}_i is Π -closed:

$$A \in \mathcal{U}_i \quad \wedge \quad (\forall x \in A \quad B_x \in \mathcal{U}_i) \quad \Rightarrow \quad \left(\prod_{x \in A} B_x \right) \in \mathcal{U}_i$$

Problem:

- Condition (3) induces a dramatic **combinatorial explosion** (if we assume $\omega \in \mathcal{U}_i$)
- Existence of such sets is not provable in ZFC \Rightarrow Need a notion of **set-theoretic universe** (ZF-universe)

ZF-universes

A **ZF-universe** is a set (of sets) \mathcal{U} such that:

- (1) if $A \in \mathcal{U}$, then $A \subset \mathcal{U}$ (\mathcal{U} is **transitive**)
- (2) if $A \in \mathcal{U}$, then $\wp(A) \in \mathcal{U}$ (\mathcal{U} is **\wp -closed**)
- (3) if $A \in \mathcal{U}$ and $\forall x \in A \ B_x \in \mathcal{U}$, then $\bigcup_{x \in A} B_x \in \mathcal{U}$ (\mathcal{U} is **\cup -closed**)
- (4) $\omega \in \mathcal{U}$ (\mathcal{U} is **infinity**)

- Such a set is closed under all the axioms of Zermelo-Fraenkel (+ choice) : pairing, powerset, comprehension, union, replacement, infinity

\Leftrightarrow Thus its existence cannot be proved in ZF (Gödel's argument)

- In particular, a ZF-universe is **II-closed** (provided we **postulate** its existence)

ZF-universes and inaccessible cardinals

- A cardinal α is (strongly) inaccessible if:

- (1) if $\beta < \alpha$, then $2^\beta < \alpha$
- (2) if $\beta < \alpha$ and $\gamma_i < \alpha$ for all $i \in \beta$, then $(\sup_{i \in \beta} \gamma_i) < \alpha$
- (3) $\aleph_0 > \alpha$

Intuitively, this definition expresses the same idea as the notion of ZF-universe, but only in terms of cardinality. In particular: *the cardinal of a ZF-universe is always inaccessible.*

- Conversely, inaccessible cardinals allow the construction of ZF-universes from the **cumulative hierarchy** (V^x) , which is transitively defined by:

$$V_0 = \emptyset, \quad V^{x+1} = \mathfrak{P}(V^x), \quad V^x = \bigcup_{y < x} V_y \quad (\text{if } x \text{ limit ordinal})$$

- **Lemma:** *If μ is inaccessible, then V^μ is a ZF-universe*

Building the universe hierarchy

We extend ZFC by adding the following axiom:

Axiom (SI^ω): *There exists infinitely many inaccessible cardinals*

Then, using this (very strong!) axiom:

- Let: $\mu_i \triangleq i$ th inaccessible cardinal, $\mathcal{N}_i \triangleq V^{\mu_i}$ (i th ZF-universe)

- From these definitions, one can easily check that for all $i \leq 1$:

$$\mathcal{N}_i \in \mathcal{N}_{i+1}, \quad \mathcal{N}_i \subset \mathcal{N}_{i+1} \quad \text{and} \quad \mathcal{N}_i \text{ is } \Pi\text{-closed}$$

Remark: Inaccessible cardinals are not strictly needed to interpret universes:

- Some clever tricks [Mellies-Werner] permit to **restrict the function spaces**
- This prevents the combinatorial explosion \Rightarrow the whole model fits in V^{ω_2}
- But this method does not work anymore in presence of inductive datatypes

Interpreting Prop

Difficulty: how to interpret the impredicativity of Prop ?

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash T : s \quad \Gamma; [x : T] \vdash U : \text{Prop}}{\Gamma \vdash T : \text{Prop}}$$

Set theoretical translation:

$$(\forall x \in A \text{ Prop}(B^x)) \Leftrightarrow \prod_{x \in A} \text{Prop}(B^x)$$

Problem: How to define the predicate $\text{Prop}(X)$?

A simple solution: $\text{Prop}(X) \equiv X$ has at most one element (proof-irrelevance)

Proof-irrelevance

- The sort of propositions Prop will be interpreted as $\{\emptyset; \{\mathbf{prf}\}\}$ (i.e. **booleans**), where **prf** is an arbitrary (but small) object that will interpret **any proof**

- **Fact:** *if $B_x \in \{\emptyset; \{\mathbf{prf}\}\}$ for all $x \in A$, then:*

$$\prod_{x \in A} B_x = \begin{cases} \emptyset & \text{if } B_x = \emptyset \text{ for some } x \in A \\ \{\emptyset; \{\mathbf{prf}\}\} & \text{if } B_x = \{\mathbf{prf}\} \text{ for all } x \in A \end{cases}$$

- **Problem:** the constant function $(x \in A \mapsto \mathbf{prf})$ is not equal to **prf** \Rightarrow must introduce some trick to identify them

Identifying singletons

- We introduce a simple mechanism of **encoding/decoding**:

$$\text{lam}(f) \stackrel{\Delta}{=} \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{prf} \\ \text{if } f = (x \in A \mapsto \text{prf}) \text{ for some } A \\ \text{otherwise } f \end{array} \right.$$

$$\text{app}(h, x) \stackrel{\Delta}{=} \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{prf} \\ \text{if } h = \text{prf} \\ \text{otherwise } h(x) \end{array} \right.$$

- Create a new cartesian product which keeps functions in their encoded form only:

$$\prod_{x \in A} B_x \stackrel{\Delta}{=} \left\{ \text{lam}(f); f \in \prod_{x \in A} B_x \right.$$

- In all cases, we have: $\text{app}(\text{lam}(f), x) = f(x)$ (provided $x \in \text{Dom}(f)$)

Model and valuations

- The **model** (i.e. the set of all **values**) is defined by:

$$\mathcal{M} = \bigcup_{x \in \mathcal{V}} V_x = V_{\text{dms}}$$

- A **valuation** is a function $\rho : \mathcal{M} \rightarrow \mathcal{V}$ associating a value $\rho(x)$ to each variable $x \in \mathcal{V}$

- The set of all valuations is denoted by $\text{Val}_{\mathcal{M}} (= \mathcal{V} \rightarrow \mathcal{M})$

- For all $\rho \in \text{Val}_{\mathcal{M}}$, $x \in \mathcal{V}$ and $v \in \mathcal{M}$ we define $(\rho; x \rightarrow v)$ by setting:

$$\Delta \equiv \left. \begin{array}{l} v \\ \text{if } \rho(x) = v \\ \text{otherwise } \rho(x) \end{array} \right\} (\rho; x \rightarrow v)$$

Interpreting terms

Each term is interpreted as a **partial function** $\llbracket M \rrbracket = (d \mapsto \llbracket M \rrbracket^d) : \text{Val}_M \rightharpoonup \mathcal{M}$ defined by induction on M as follows:

$$\begin{aligned}
 \llbracket x \rrbracket^d &= (x) \\
 \llbracket \text{Prop} \rrbracket^d &= \{ \emptyset; \{\text{prf}\} \} \\
 \llbracket \text{Type}_i \rrbracket^d &= \mathcal{N}_i (= V^{N_i}) \\
 \llbracket \Pi x : T . U \rrbracket^d &= \underbrace{\prod_{v \in \llbracket T \rrbracket^d} \llbracket U \rrbracket^{d;x:v}}_{\text{(provided it belongs to } \mathcal{M})} \\
 \llbracket \lambda x : T . M \rrbracket^d &= \text{lamb}(v \in \llbracket T \rrbracket^d \mapsto \llbracket M \rrbracket^{d;x:v}) \quad \text{(provided it belongs to } \mathcal{M}) \\
 \llbracket MN \rrbracket^d &= \text{app}(\llbracket M \rrbracket^d, \llbracket N \rrbracket^d) \quad \text{(may be undefined)}
 \end{aligned}$$

Remark: Application introduces partiality, as well as Π and λ (that may not fit in \mathcal{M})

Interpreting contexts

- A valuation $\rho : \mathcal{V} \rightarrow \mathcal{M}$ is **adapted** to a context $\Gamma = [x_1 : T_1; \dots; x_n : T_n]$ if:

$$\forall i \in [1..n] \quad \rho(x_i) \in \llbracket T_i \rrbracket^\rho$$

- The interpretation of a context is the set of all its adapted valuations:

$$\llbracket \Gamma \rrbracket \triangleq \{ \rho \in \mathbf{Val}_{\mathcal{M}}; \rho \text{ is adapted to } \Gamma \}$$

- Inductive characterization:

$$\llbracket [] \rrbracket = \mathbf{Val}_{\mathcal{M}}, \quad \llbracket \Gamma; [x : T] \rrbracket = \{ \rho \in \llbracket \Gamma \rrbracket; \rho(x) \in \llbracket T \rrbracket^\rho \}$$

\Rightarrow The longest the context, the smallest its interpretation

Remark: the interpretation of a context **may be empty** (i.e. $\llbracket \Gamma \rrbracket = \emptyset$ for some Γ)

Soundness

- **Variable dependence:** $\llbracket M \rrbracket^\rho$ only depends on the values $\rho(x)$ for $x \in FV(M)$
 \Leftrightarrow if M is **closed**, then $\llbracket M \rrbracket^\rho$ **does not depend on ρ** (usually denoted $\llbracket M \rrbracket$)

- **Substitutivity:** $\llbracket M \rrbracket^\rho \{x := N\} = \llbracket M \rrbracket^{\rho[x \mapsto \llbracket N \rrbracket^\rho]}$ (for all M, N, x, ρ)

[Notice that the lefthand side is defined iff the righthand side is defined too]

- **Soundness of typing:** if $\Gamma \vdash M : T$, then for all $\rho \in \llbracket \Gamma \rrbracket$
 $\llbracket M \rrbracket^\rho, \llbracket T \rrbracket^\rho$ are well defined and $\llbracket M \rrbracket^\rho \in \llbracket T \rrbracket^\rho$

- **Soundness of β -reduction:** if $\Gamma \vdash M : T$ and $M \rightarrow_\beta M'$, then:
 $\llbracket M \rrbracket^\rho = \llbracket M' \rrbracket^\rho$ (for all $\rho \in \llbracket \Gamma \rrbracket$)

Problem for proving soundness...

- Soundness of typing

$$\Gamma \vdash M : T, \rho \in \llbracket \Gamma \rrbracket \Leftrightarrow \llbracket M \rrbracket_\rho \in \llbracket T \rrbracket_\rho$$

cannot be simply proven by induction on $\Gamma \vdash M : T$.

- Almost all the typing rules (VAR, SORT, PROD, LAM, APP, CUM) successfully pass the test...
 - ... but the typing rule **CONV** fails, because the implication

$$M \rightarrow_\beta M' \not\Rightarrow \llbracket M \rrbracket_\rho = \llbracket M' \rrbracket_\rho$$

does not hold for **raw-terms** M, M' .

- We should prove **soundness of typing** and **soundness of (typed) β -reduction** simultaneously...
 - ... but it seems hard to do it simply (and correctly).

... and how to fix it

- A simple idea:
 - introduce an **explicit error**: $\llbracket M \rrbracket : \text{Val}_M \rightarrow M \cup \{\text{err}\}$
 - prove that: $M \rightarrow_{\beta} M', \llbracket M \rrbracket \neq \text{err} \Leftrightarrow \llbracket M' \rrbracket = \llbracket M \rrbracket$ (*)
 - reformulate soundness as: if $\Gamma \vdash M : T$ and $\rho \in \llbracket \Gamma \rrbracket$, then:
 - $\llbracket M \rrbracket \rho \neq \text{err}, \llbracket T \rrbracket \rho \neq \text{err}$ and $\llbracket M \rrbracket \rho \in \llbracket T \rrbracket \rho$
 - \Rightarrow Does not work due to the **impredicativity** of Prop ((*) does not hold)
- Consider **typed applications + typed redexes** [Altenkirch, Mellies-Werner]
 - $\textcircled{A}(\lambda x : A. M, N) \rightarrow_{\beta} M \{x := N\}$ only if types (A) match
- Replace untyped conversion by an **equality judgment** [Martin-Löf]

Consistency

- The intuitionistic falsity $\perp \triangleq \Pi X : \text{Prop} . X$ is interpreted as

$$\perp = \prod_{a \in \{\emptyset; \text{prf}\}} a = \prod_{a \in \{\text{Prop}\}^d} \llbracket X \rrbracket_{d; X \leftarrow a} = \prod_{a \in \{\text{Prop}\}^d} \widehat{\prod} a$$
- Assume there is some M such that $\llbracket \vdash M : \Pi X : \text{Prop} . X \rrbracket = \text{Val}_M$

 - Take an arbitrary $d \in \llbracket \llbracket \rrbracket \rrbracket = \text{Val}_M$
 - From soundness we get: $\llbracket M \rrbracket_d \in \llbracket \Pi X : \text{Prop} . X \rrbracket_d = \emptyset$ (*absurdity*)
 - Hence the assumption is false $\Rightarrow C\omega$ is *logically consistent*
- **Remark:** A very simple proof, which relies on the *soundness* property \Rightarrow But this result has been proved in a very strong set theory $(\text{ZFC} + \text{SI}^\omega)$

Interpretation of connectives

- Intuitionistic connectives are defined in $\mathcal{C}\omega$ as:

\perp	:	$\text{Prop} \rightarrow \text{Prop} \cdot X$	\equiv	Δ	:	$\text{Prop} \rightarrow \text{Prop} \cdot X \rightarrow X$
\neg	:	$\text{Prop} \rightarrow \text{Prop}$	\equiv	Δ	:	$\lambda A : \text{Prop} . A \rightarrow \perp$
\wedge	:	$\text{Prop} \rightarrow \text{Prop} \rightarrow \text{Prop}$	\equiv	Δ	:	$\lambda A, B : \text{Prop} . \Pi X : \text{Prop} . (A \rightarrow B \rightarrow X) \rightarrow X$
\vee	:	$\text{Prop} \rightarrow \text{Prop} \rightarrow \text{Prop}$	\equiv	Δ	:	$\lambda A, B : \text{Prop} . \Pi X : \text{Prop} . (A \rightarrow X) \rightarrow (B \rightarrow X) \rightarrow X$
\Rightarrow	:	$\text{Prop} \rightarrow \text{Prop} \rightarrow \text{Prop}$	\equiv	Δ	:	$\lambda A, B : \text{Prop} . A \rightarrow B$

- Let $\mathbf{0} = \emptyset$ (**false**) and $\mathbf{1} = \{\text{prf}\}$ (**true**). Thanks to soundness, we have:

$$\llbracket \perp \rrbracket, \llbracket \top \rrbracket \in \{0; 1\}; \quad \llbracket \neg \rrbracket \in \{0; 1\} \rightarrow \{0; 1\}; \quad \llbracket \wedge \rrbracket, \llbracket \vee \rrbracket, \llbracket \Rightarrow \rrbracket \in \{0; 1\} \rightarrow \{0; 1\} \rightarrow \{0; 1\}$$

- Since the objects $\llbracket \perp \rrbracket, \llbracket \top \rrbracket, \llbracket \wedge \rrbracket, \llbracket \vee \rrbracket$ and $\llbracket \Rightarrow \rrbracket$ are **finite**, we can easily check that

$$\llbracket \neg \rrbracket(\mathbf{0}) = \mathbf{1}, \quad \llbracket \neg \rrbracket(\mathbf{1}) = \mathbf{0}, \quad \llbracket \wedge \rrbracket(\mathbf{0}, \mathbf{0}) = \mathbf{0}, \quad \text{etc.} \quad (\text{classical truth-values tables})$$

[In the same way, intuitionistic quantifiers \forall and \exists become **classical** in the model]

Adding axioms in the context

- A context Γ is:
 - **consistent** if there is no M such that $\Gamma \vdash M : \perp$
 - **satisfiable** if there is some $\rho \in \llbracket \Gamma \rrbracket$

● **Lemma:** *Any satisfiable context is consistent* (same proof as for consistency)

- To extend a given satisfiable context Γ (with a given $\rho \in \llbracket \Gamma \rrbracket$):
 - Take a type T such that $\llbracket T \rrbracket_\rho \neq \emptyset$, and pick some $v \in \llbracket T \rrbracket_\rho$
 - Then $\llbracket \Gamma; [x : T] \rrbracket$ is satisfiable, with the valuation $(\rho; x \mapsto v) \in \llbracket \Gamma; [x : T] \rrbracket$

- **Morality:**
 - T provable $\Leftrightarrow \llbracket T \rrbracket \neq \emptyset$
 - T not provable $\Leftrightarrow \llbracket T \rrbracket = \emptyset$
 - T consistent (can be safely added as an axiom) $\Leftrightarrow \llbracket T \rrbracket \neq \emptyset$

Some valid propositions

- Propositional axioms**
 - $\forall A : \text{Prop} . A \vee \neg A$ (excluded middle)
 - $\forall A : \text{Prop} . \forall x, y : A . x =_A y$ (proof-irrelevance)
 - $\forall A : \text{Prop} . A =_{\text{Prop}} \perp \vee A =_{\text{Prop}} \top$ (implies both E.M. and P.I.)

- Functional extensionality:**

$$\forall f, g : T \rightarrow U . [\forall x : T . f(x) =_U g(x)] \Rightarrow f =_{T \rightarrow U} g$$

- Axiom of choice:**

$$[\forall x : T . \exists y : U . R(x, y)] \Rightarrow \exists f : T \rightarrow U . \forall x : T . R(x, f(x))$$

- Hilbert's epsilon** (for any inhabited type T):

$$\epsilon : (T \rightarrow \text{Prop}) \rightarrow T$$

$$\forall P : T \rightarrow \text{Prop} . [\exists x . P(x)] \Rightarrow P(\epsilon(P))$$

About the interpretation of Type_1

- Inaccessible cardinals are not necessary to interpret Type_1
 - \Rightarrow We can interpret Type_1 by V_ω (set of all **hereditarily finite sets**)
 - [Remember that: $V_0 = \emptyset$, $V_{n+1} = \mathfrak{P}(V_n)$, $V_\omega = \bigcup V_n$]
 - This set is Π -closed, and contains $\{\emptyset, \{\mathbf{prf}\}\}$ (provided $\mathbf{prf} \in V_\omega$)
 - Shift the whole hierarchy: $\mathcal{N}_1 = V_\omega$, $\mathcal{N}_2 = V_{\mathcal{N}_1}$, $\mathcal{N}_3 = V_{\mathcal{N}_2}$, etc.
 - With this new construction, **soundness** still holds
 - This model shows that there is **no provably infinite datatype** in Type_1 (because the denotation of such a type would be infinite. . .)
 - \Rightarrow But this is no more true in Type_i for $i \geq 2$ (cf next lecture)

An advanced exercise

In your favorite functional language (here, Objective Caml), implement the finitary model of the Calculus of Constructions:

```
type term =
  | Rel of int
  | de Bruijn index *
  | Prop | Type
  | (* sorts *)
  | Prd of term * term
  | (* dependent product *)
  | Lam of term * term
  | (* abstraction *)
  | App of term * term ;;
  (* application *)

type denot =
  | Prf
  | (* unique proof object *)
  | Set of denot list
  | (* finite set (type), as a list *)
  | Fun of (denot * denot) list ;;
  (* function, as an association list *)

exception Undefined ;;

val interp : term -> denot list -> denot ;;
(* may raise Undefined *)
```

Conclusion

- A simple way of checking consistency (independently from SN) \Leftrightarrow Any proof of SN needs the same ingredients (+ reducibility)

- **Possible extensions** (without changing the model):

- Inductive datatypes, record types

- Subtyping with covariance (such as in ECC [Luo 84]):

$$\frac{B < \bar{B}' \quad A \mapsto B \leq \bar{A} \mapsto B'}{A \mapsto B \leq \bar{A} \mapsto B'}$$

- All the 'classical' mathematics (quotients, reals, etc.)

- **Things that cannot be interpreted** (in this model)

- Intuitionistic features (non-provability of E.M., sort **Set** of Coq)

- Domain-free abstractions (i.e. $\lambda x. M$ of DFPTS [Barthe])

- Subtyping with contravariance (in some versions of ECC):

$$\frac{A < \bar{A}' \quad A' \mapsto B \leq \bar{A} \mapsto B}{A < \bar{A}'}$$