

Improving Software Quality with Type Qualifiers

Jeff Foster
University of Maryland

Joint work with Alex Aiken, Rob Johnson, John Kodumal, Tachio Terauchi, and David Wagner

Introduction


- Ensuring that software is reliable is hard
 - And doing so is important

[T]he national annual costs of an inadequate infrastructure for software testing is estimated to range from \$22.2 to \$59.5 billion.

-- NIST Planning Report 02-3, May 2002

Current Practice


- Testing
 - Make sure program runs correctly on set of inputs



- Drawbacks: Expensive, difficult, hard to cover all code paths, no guarantees

Current Practice (cont'd)

- Code Auditing
 - Convince someone else your source code is correct
 - Drawbacks: Expensive, hard, no guarantees



And If You're Worried about Security...

A **malicious adversary** is trying to exploit anything you miss!



What more can we do?

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Tools for Software Quality

- What more can we do?
 - Build tools that analyze source code (static analysis)
 - Reason about all possible runs of the program
 - Check limited but very useful properties
 - Eliminate categories of errors
 - Let people concentrate on the deep reasoning
 - Develop programming models
 - Avoid mistakes in the first place
 - Encourage programmers to think about and make manifest their assumptions

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Oops — We Can't Do This!

- Rice's Theorem: No computer program can precisely determine anything interesting about arbitrary source code
 - Does this program terminate?
 - Does this program produce value 42?
 - Does this program raise an exception?
 - Is this program correct?

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The Art of Static Analysis

- Programmers don't write arbitrarily complicated programs
- Programmers have ways to control complexity
 - Otherwise they couldn't make sense of them
- Target: Be precise for the programs that programmers want to write
 - It's OK to forbid yucky code in the name of safety

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Tools Need Specifications

```
spin_lock_irqsave(&tty->read_lock, flags);
put_tty_queue_nolock(c, tty);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&tty->read_lock, flags);
```

- Goal: Add specifications to programs

In a way that...

- Programmers will accept
 - Lightweight
- Scales to large programs
- Solves many different problems

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Type Qualifiers

- Extend standard type systems (C, Java, ML)
 - Programmers already use types
 - Programmers understand types
 - Get programmers to write down a little more...

```
const int           ANSI C
ptr(tainted char)  Format-string vulnerabilities
kernel ptr(char) → char User/kernel vulnerabilities
```

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Application: Format String Vulnerabilities

- I/O functions in C use format strings

```
printf("Hello!");           Hello!
printf("Hello, %s!", name);  Hello, name!
```

- Instead of

```
printf("%s", name);
```

Why not

```
printf(name);           ?
```

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Format String Attacks

- Adversary-controlled format specifier

```
name := <data-from-network>
printf(name); /* Oops */
```

- Attacker sets name = "%s%s%s" to crash program
- Attacker sets name = "...%n..." to write to memory
 - Yields (often remote root) exploits
- Lots of these bugs in the wild
 - New ones weekly on bugtraq mailing list
 - Too restrictive to forbid variable format strings

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Using Tainted and Untainted

- Add qualifier annotations

```
int printf(untainted char *fmt, ...)
tainted char *getenv(const char *)
```

tainted = may be controlled by adversary

untainted = must not be controlled by adversary

Subtyping

```
void f(tainted int);
untainted int a;
f(a);
```

OK

f accepts tainted or
untainted data

untainted \leq tainted

```
void g(untainted int);
tainted int b;
g(b);
```

Error

g accepts only untainted
data

tainted $\not\leq$ untainted

untainted < tainted

Demo of cqual

<http://www.cs.umd.edu/~jfooster>

The Plan

- The Nice Theory
- The Icky Stuff in C
- Something Completely Different
 - (Not really)

A Simple Language

- We'll add type qualifiers to lambda calculus
 - ...with a few extra constructs
 - Same approach works for other languages (like C)

```
e ::= x | n | true | false | if e then e else e
    | fun f (x:t):t = e | e e
t ::= int | bool | t → t
```

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Type Qualifiers

- Let Q be the set of type qualifiers
 - Assumed to be chosen in advance and fixed
 - E.g., $Q = \{\text{tainted}, \text{untainted}\}$
- Then the *qualified types* are just
 - $qt ::= \text{int}^Q \mid \text{bool}^Q \mid qt \rightarrow^Q qt$

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Abstract Syntax with Qualifiers

```
e ::= x | n | true | false | if e then e else e
    | fun fQ (x:qt):qt = e | e e | annot(Q, e) | check(Q, e)
```

- $\text{annot}(Q, e)$ = "expression e has qualifier Q "
 - Will sometimes write as superscript
- $\text{check}(Q, e)$ = "fail if e does not have qualifier Q "
 - Checks only the top-level qualifier
- Examples:
 - $\text{fun fread } (x:qt):\text{int}^{\text{tainted}} = \dots 42^{\text{tainted}}$
 - $\text{fun printf } (x:qt):qt' = \text{check}(\text{untainted}, x), \dots$

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Typing Rules: Qualifier Introduction

- Newly-constructed values have "bare" types

$$\frac{}{G \vdash n : \text{int}}$$
$$\frac{}{G \vdash \text{true} : \text{bool}} \quad \frac{}{G \vdash \text{false} : \text{bool}}$$

- Annotation adds an outermost qualifier

$$\frac{}{G \vdash e_1 : s}$$
$$G \vdash \text{annot}(Q, e) : Q s$$

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Typing Rules: Qualifier Elimination

- By default, discard qualifier at destructors

$$\frac{G \vdash e1 : \text{bool}^Q \quad G \vdash e2 : \text{qt} \quad G \vdash e3 : \text{qt}}{G \vdash \text{if } e1 \text{ then } e2 \text{ else } e3 : \text{qt}}$$

- Use `check()` if you want to do a test

$$\frac{G \vdash e1 : Qs}{G \vdash \text{check}(Q, e) : Qs}$$

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Subtyping

- Our example used *subtyping*
 - If anyone expecting a `T` can be given an `S` instead, then `S` is a *subtype* of `T`.
 - Allows `untainted` to be passed to `tainted` positions
 - I.e., `check(tainted, annot(untainted, 42))` should typecheck
- How do we add that to our system?

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
Partial Orders

- Qualifiers `Q` come with a partial order \leq :
 - $q \leq q$ (reflexive)
 - $q \leq p, p \leq q \Rightarrow q = p$ (anti-symmetric)
 - $q \leq p, p \leq r \Rightarrow q \leq r$ (transitive)
- Qualifiers introduce subtyping
- In our example:
 - `untainted` $<$ `tainted`

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Example Partial Orders



- Lower in picture = lower in partial order
- Edges show \leq relations

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Combining Partial Orders


- Let (Q_1, \leq_1) and (Q_2, \leq_2) be partial orders
- We can form a new partial order, their cross-product:

$$(Q_1, \leq_1) \times (Q_2, \leq_2) = (Q, \leq)$$

where

- $Q = Q_1 \times Q_2$
- $(a, b) \leq (c, d)$ if $a \leq_1 c$ and $b \leq_2 d$

Example



- Makes sense with orthogonal sets of qualifiers
 - Allows us to write type rules assuming only one set of qualifiers

Extending the Qualifier Order to Types

$$\frac{Q \leq Q'}{\text{bool}^Q \leq \text{bool}^{Q'}} \quad \frac{Q \leq Q'}{\text{int}^Q \leq \text{int}^{Q'}}$$

- Add one new rule *subsumption* to type system

$$\frac{G \vdash e : qt \quad qt \leq qt'}{G \vdash e : qt'}$$

- Means: If any position requires an expression of type qt' , it is safe to provide it a subtype qt

Use of Subsumption

$$\frac{\frac{\frac{}{|- 42 : \text{int}}{|- \text{annot}(\text{untainted}, 42) : \text{untainted int}}{|- \text{annot}(\text{untainted}, 42) : \text{tainted int}}}{|- \text{check}(\text{tainted}, \text{annot}(\text{untainted}, 42)) : \text{tainted int}} \quad \text{untainted} \leq \text{tainted}}{|- \text{check}(\text{tainted}, \text{annot}(\text{untainted}, 42)) : \text{tainted int}}$$

Subtyping on Function Types

- What about function types?

$$\frac{?}{qt1 \rightarrow^Q qt2 \leq qt1' \rightarrow^Q qt2'}$$

- Recall: S is a subtype of T if an S can be used anywhere a T is expected
 - When can we replace a call "f x" with a call "g x"?

Replacing "f x" by "g x"

- When is $\underbrace{qt1' \rightarrow^{Q'} qt2'}_g \leq \underbrace{qt1 \rightarrow^Q qt2}_f$?

- Return type:
 - We are expecting $qt2$ (f's return type)
 - So we can only return *at most* $qt2$
 - $qt2' \leq qt2$
- Example: A function that returns **tainted** can be replaced with one that returns **untainted**

Replacing "f x" by "g x" (cont'd)

- When is $\underbrace{qt1' \rightarrow^{Q'} qt2'}_g \leq \underbrace{qt1 \rightarrow^Q qt2}_f$?

- Argument type:
 - We are supposed to accept $qt1$ (f's argument type)
 - So we must accept *at least* $qt1$
 - $qt1 \leq qt1'$
- Example: A function that accepts **untainted** can be replaced with one that accepts **tainted**

Subtyping on Function Types

$$\frac{qt1' \leq qt1 \quad qt2 \leq qt2' \quad Q \leq Q'}{qt1 \rightarrow^Q qt2 \leq qt1' \rightarrow^{Q'} qt2'}$$

- We say that \rightarrow is
 - *Covariant* in the range (subtyping dir the same)
 - *Contravariant* in the domain (subtyping dir flips)

Dynamic Semantics with Qualifiers

- Operational semantics tags values with qualifiers
 - $v ::= x \mid n^Q \mid \text{true}^Q \mid \text{false}^Q$
 - $\text{fun } f^Q(x : qt1) : qt2 = e$
- Evaluation rules same as usual, carrying the qualifiers along, e.g.,

$\text{if } \text{true}^Q \text{ then } e1 \text{ else } e2 \rightarrow e1$

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Dynamic Semantics with Qualifiers (cont'd)

- One new rule checks a qualifier:
$$\frac{Q' \leq Q}{\text{check}(Q, v^Q) \rightarrow v}$$
 - Evaluation at a *check* can continue only if the qualifier matches what is expected
 - Otherwise the program gets *stuck*
 - (Also need rule to evaluate under a *check*)

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Soundness

- We want to prove
 - Preservation: Evaluation preserves types
 - Progress: Well-typed programs don't get stuck
- Proof: Exercise
 - See if you can adapt standard proofs to this system
 - (Not too much work; really just need to show that *check* doesn't get stuck)

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Updateable References

- Our language is missing *side-effects*
 - There's no way to write to memory
 - Recall that this doesn't limit expressiveness
 - But side-effects sure are handy

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Language Extension

- We'll add ML-style references
 - $e ::= \dots \mid \text{ref}^Q e \mid !e \mid e := e$
 - $\text{ref}^Q e$ -- Allocate memory and set its contents to e
 - Returns memory location
 - Q is qualifier on pointer (not on contents)
 - $!e$ -- Return the contents of memory location e
 - $e1 := e2$ -- Update $e1$'s contents to contain $e2$
 - Things to notice
 - No null pointers (memory always initialized)
 - No mutable local variables (only pointers to heap allowed)

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Static Semantics

- Extend type language with references:

$qt ::= \dots \mid \text{ref}^Q qt$

- Note: In ML the ref appears on the right

$$\frac{G \Vdash e : qt}{G \Vdash \text{ref}^Q e : \text{ref}^Q qt}$$

$$\frac{G \Vdash e : \text{ref}^Q qt}{G \Vdash !e : qt} \quad \frac{G \Vdash e1 : \text{ref}^Q qt \quad G \Vdash e2 : qt}{G \Vdash e1 := e2 : qt}$$

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Subtyping References

- The *wrong* rule for subtyping references is

$$\frac{Q \leq Q' \quad qt \leq qt'}{\text{ref}^Q qt \leq \text{ref}^{Q'} qt'}$$

- Counterexample

```
let x = ref 0untainted in
let y = x in
y := 3tainted;
check(untainted, !x)    oops!
```

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You've Got Aliasing!

- We have multiple names for the same memory location
 - But they have different types
 - And we can **write** into memory at different types



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Solution #1: Java's Approach

- Java uses this subtyping rule
 - If S is a subclass of T , then $S[]$ is a subclass of $T[]$
- Counterexample:
 - `Foo[] a = new Foo[5];`
 - `Object[] b = a;`
 - `b[0] = new Object();` // forbidden at runtime
 - `a[0].foo();` // ...so this can't happen

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Solution #2: Purely Static Approach

- Reason from rules for functions
 - A reference is like an object with two methods:
 - `get : unit → qt`
 - `set : qt → unit`
 - Notice that qt occurs both co- and contravariantly
- The right rule:

$$\frac{Q \leq Q' \quad qt \leq qt' \quad qt' \leq qt}{\text{ref}^Q qt \leq \text{ref}^{Q'} qt'} \quad \text{or} \quad \frac{Q \leq Q' \quad qt = qt'}{\text{ref}^Q qt \leq \text{ref}^{Q'} qt'}$$

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Soundness

- We want to prove
 - Preservation: Evaluation preserves types
 - Progress: Well-typed programs don't get stuck
- Can you prove it with updateable references?
 - Hint: You'll need a stronger induction hypothesis
 - You'll need to reason about types in the store
 - E.g., so that if you retrieve a value out of the store, you know what type it has

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Type Qualifier Inference

- Recall our motivating example
 - We gave a legacy C program that had *no information* about qualifiers
 - We added signatures *only* for the standard library functions
 - Then we checked whether there were any contradictions
- This requires *type qualifier inference*

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Type Qualifier Inference Statement

- Given a program with
 - Qualifier annotations
 - Some qualifier checks
 - And no other information about qualifiers
- Does there exist a valid typing of the program?
- We want an algorithm to solve this problem

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First Problem: Subsumption Rule

$$\frac{G \vdash e : qt \quad qt \leq qt'}{G \vdash e : qt'}$$

$$G \vdash e : qt'$$

- We're allowed to apply this rule at any time
 - Makes it hard to develop a deterministic algorithm
 - Type checking is not *syntax driven*
- Fortunately, we don't have that many choices
 - For each expression e , we need to decide
 - Do we apply the "regular" rule for e ?
 - Or do we apply subsumption (how many times)?

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Getting Rid of Subsumption

- Lemma: Multiple sequential uses of subsumption can be collapsed into a single use
 - Proof: Transitivity of \leq
- So now we need only apply subsumption once after each expression

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Getting Rid of Subsumption (cont'd)

- We can get rid of the separate subsumption rule

$$\frac{G \vdash e1 : qt' \rightarrow^Q qt'' \quad G \vdash e2 : qt \quad qt \leq qt'}{G \vdash e1 e2 : qt''}$$

$$G \vdash e1 e2 : qt''$$

$$\frac{G \vdash e : Q' s \quad Q' \leq Q}{G \vdash \text{check}(Q, e) : Q s}$$

$$G \vdash \text{check}(Q, e) : Q s$$

- Apply the same reasoning to the other rules
 - We're left with a purely syntax-directed system

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Second Problem: Assumptions

- Let's take a look at the rule for functions:

$$\frac{G, f: qt1 \rightarrow^Q qt2, x:qt1 \mid\!-\! e : qt2' \quad qt2' \leq qt2}{G \mid\!-\! \text{fun } f^Q(x:qt1):qt2 = e : qt1 \rightarrow^Q qt2}$$

- There's a problem with applying this rule
 - We're assuming that we're given the argument type $qt1$ and the result type $qt2$
 - But in the problem statement, we said we only have annotations and checks

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Type Checking vs. Type Inference

- Let's think about C 's type system
 - C requires programmers to annotate function types
 - ...but not other places
 - E.g., when you write down $3 + 4$, you don't need to give that a type
 - So all type systems trade off programmer annotations vs. computed information
- Type checking = it's "obvious" how to check
- Type inference = it's "more work" to check

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Why Do We Want Qualifier Inference?

- Because our programs weren't written with qualifiers in mind
 - They don't have qualifiers in their type annotations
 - In particular, functions don't list qualifiers for their arguments
- Because it's less work for the programmer
 - ...but it's harder to understand when a program doesn't type check

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Adding Fresh Qualifiers

- We'll add qualifier variables a, b, c, \dots to our set of qualifiers
 - (Letters closer to p, q, r will stand for constants)
- Define $\text{fresh} : t \rightarrow qt$ as
 - $\text{fresh}(\text{int}) = \text{int}^a$
 - $\text{fresh}(\text{bool}) = \text{bool}^a$
 - $\text{fresh}(\text{ref}^Q t) = \text{ref}^a \text{fresh}(t)$
 - $\text{fresh}(t1 \rightarrow t2) = \text{fresh}(t1) \rightarrow^a \text{fresh}(t2)$
 - Where a is fresh


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Rule for Functions

$$\frac{qt1 = \text{fresh}(t1) \quad qt2 = \text{fresh}(t2) \quad G, f: qt1 \rightarrow^Q qt2, x:qt1 \dashv\vdash e: qt2' \quad qt2' \leq qt2}{G \dashv\vdash \text{fun } f^Q(x:t1):t2 = e: qt1 \rightarrow^Q qt2}$$

A Picture of Fresh Qualifiers



Where Are We?

- A syntax-directed system
 - For each expression, clear which rule to apply
- Constant qualifiers
- Variable qualifiers
 - Want to find a valid assignment to constant qualifiers
- Constraints $qt \leq qt'$ and $Q \leq Q'$
 - These restrict our use of qualifiers
 - These will limit solutions for qualifier variables

Qualifier Inference Algorithm

1. Apply syntax-directed type inference rules
 - This generates fresh unknowns and constraints among the unknowns
2. Solve the constraints
 - Either compute a *solution*
 - Or fail, if there is no solution
 - Implies the program has a type error
 - Implies the program *may* have a bug

Solving Constraints: Step 1

- Constraints of the form $qt \leq qt'$ and $Q \leq Q'$
 - $qt ::= int^Q \mid bool^Q \mid qt \rightarrow^Q qt \mid ref^Q qt$
- Solve by simplifying
 - Can read solution off of simplified constraints
- We'll present algorithm as a rewrite system
 - $S \Rightarrow S'$ means constraints S rewrite to (simpler) constraints S'

Solving Constraints: Step 1


- $S + \{ int^Q \leq int^{Q'} \} \Rightarrow S + \{ Q \leq Q' \}$
- $S + \{ bool^Q \leq bool^{Q'} \} \Rightarrow S + \{ Q \leq Q' \}$
- $S + \{ qt1 \rightarrow^Q qt2 \leq qt1' \rightarrow^{Q'} qt2' \} \Rightarrow$
 $S + \{ qt1' \leq qt1 \} + \{ qt2 \leq qt2' \} + \{ Q \leq Q' \}$
- $S + \{ ref^Q qt1 \leq ref^{Q'} qt2 \} \Rightarrow$
 $S + \{ qt1 \leq qt2 \} + \{ qt2 \leq qt1 \} + \{ Q \leq Q' \}$
- $S + \{ \text{mismatched constructors} \} \Rightarrow \text{error}$
 - Can't happen if program correct w.r.t. std types

Solving Constraints: Step 2


- Our type system is called a *structural subtyping system*
 - If $qt \leq qt'$, then qt and qt' have the same shape
- When we're done with step 1, we're left with constraints of the form $Q \leq Q'$
 - Where either of Q, Q' may be an unknown
 - This is called an *atomic subtyping system*
 - That's because qualifiers don't have any "structure"

Constraint Generation

$ptr(int) f(x : int) = \{ \dots \} \quad y := f(z)$



Constraints as Graphs



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Some Bad News

- Solving atomic subtyping constraints is NP-hard in the general case
- The problem comes up with some really weird partial orders



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But That's OK

- These partial orders don't seem to come up in practice
 - Not very natural
- Most qualifier partial orders have one of two desirable properties:
 - They either always have *least upper bounds* or *greatest lower bounds* for any pair of qualifiers

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Lubs and Glbs

- lub = Least upper bound
 - $p \text{ lub } q = r$ such that
 - $p \leq r$ and $q \leq r$
 - If $p \leq s$ and $q \leq s$, then $r \leq s$
- glb = Greatest lower bound, defined dually
- lub and glb may not exist

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Lattices


- A *lattice* is a partial order such that lubs and glbs always exist
- If \mathcal{Q} is a lattice, it turns out we can use a really simple algorithm to check satisfiability of constraints over \mathcal{Q}

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Satisfiability via Graph Reachability

Is there an inconsistent path through the graph?




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Satisfiability via Graph Reachability

Is there an inconsistent path through the graph?




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Satisfiability via Graph Reachability

tainted \leq a6 \leq a1 \leq a3 \leq a5 \leq a7 \leq untainted



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Satisfiability in Linear Time

- Initial program of size n
 - Fixed set of qualifiers **tainted**, **untainted**, ...
- Constraint generation yields $O(n)$ constraints
 - Recursive abstract syntax tree walk
- Graph reachability takes $O(n)$ time
 - Works for semi-lattices, discrete p.o., products

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Limitations of Subtyping

- Subtyping gives us a kind of *polymorphism*
 - A *polymorphic* type represents multiple types
 - In a subtyping system, **qt** represents **qt** and all of **qt**'s subtypes
- As we saw, this flexibility helps make the analysis more precise
 - But it isn't always enough...

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Limitations of Subtype Polymorphism

- Consider **tainted** and **untainted** again
 - **untainted** \leq **tainted**
- Let's look at the identity function
 - **fun id (x:int):int = x**
- What qualified types can we infer for **id**?

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Types for id


- **fun id (x:int):int = x**
 - **tainted int** \rightarrow **tainted int**
 - Fine but **untainted** data passed in becomes **tainted**
 - **untainted int** \rightarrow **untainted int**
 - Fine but can't pass in **tainted** data
 - **untainted int** \rightarrow **tainted int**
 - Not too useful
 - **tainted int** \rightarrow **untainted int**
 - Impossible

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Function Calls and Context-Sensitivity

```
char *strdup(char *str) {
  // return a copy of str
}
char *a = strdup(tainted_string);
char *b = strdup(untainted_string);
```



- All calls to `strdup` conflated
 - *Monomorphic or context-insensitive*

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What's Happening Here?


- The qualifier on `x` appears both covariantly and contravariantly in the type
 - We're stuck
- We need *parametric polymorphism*
 - Consider `fun id (x:int):int = x`

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The Observation of Parametric Polymorphism

- Type inference on `id` yields a proof like this:




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The Observation of Parametric Polymorphism

- We can duplicate this proof *for any* `a, a'`, *in any* type environment




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The Observation of Parametric Polymorphism

- Thus when we use `id`...




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The Observation of Parametric Polymorphism

- We can "inline" its type, with a different `a` each time



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Polymorphically Constrained Types

- Notice that we inlined not only the *type* (as in ML), but also the *constraints*
- We need polymorphically constrained types
 - $x : \forall a.q\uparrow$ where C
 - For any qualifiers a where constraints C hold, x has type $q\uparrow$

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Examples of Polymorphically Constrained Types


- `int id(int x) { return x; }`
 - $id : \forall a,b. a \text{ int} \rightarrow b \text{ int}$ where $a \leq b$
- `char *strcat(char *s, char *append);`
 - $strcat : \forall a,b,c. (a \text{ char}^* \times b \text{ char}^*) \rightarrow c \text{ char}^*$ where $b \leq c, a = c$
- `void *malloc(size_t size);`
 - $malloc : \forall a. () \rightarrow a \text{ void}^*$ where $[]$

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Polymorphically Constrained Types

- Must copy constraints at each instantiation
 - Looks inefficient
 - (And hard to implement)



Comparison to Type Polymorphism

- ML-style polymorphic type inference is EXPTIME-hard
 - In practice, it's fine
 - Bad case can't happen here, because we're polymorphic *only* in the qualifiers
 - That's because we'll apply this to C

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
A Better Solution: CFL Reachability

- Can reduce this to another problem
 - Equivalent to the constraint-copying formulation
 - Supports polymorphic recursion in qualifiers
 - It's easy to implement
 - It's efficient: $O(n^3)$
 - Previous best algorithm $O(n^8)$ [Mossin, PhD thesis]
- Idea due to Horwitz, Reps, and Sagiv [POPL'95], and Rehof, Fahndrich, and Das [POPL'01]

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The Problem Restated: Unrealizable Paths




- No execution can exhibit that particular call/return sequence

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Only Propagate Along Realizable Paths



- Add edge labels for calls and returns
 - Only propagate along *valid* paths whose returns balance calls

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Type Rule for Instantiation

- Now when we mention the name of a function, we'll instantiate it using the following rule

$$\frac{qt = G(f) \quad qt' = \text{fresh}(qt) \quad qt \xrightarrow{i} qt'}{G \vdash\text{-} f_i : qt'}$$

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Rules for Propagating Parenthesis Edges

- $S + \{ \text{int}^Q \xrightarrow{i} \text{int}^{Q'} \} \implies S + \{ Q \xrightarrow{i} Q' \}$
- $S + \{ \text{int}^Q \xrightarrow{(i)} \text{int}^{Q'} \} \implies S + \{ Q \xrightarrow{(i)} Q' \}$

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Rules for Propagating Parenthesis Edges


- $S + \{ qt1 \xrightarrow{Q} qt2 \xrightarrow{i} qt1' \xrightarrow{Q'} qt2' \} \implies$
 $S + \{ qt1' \xrightarrow{(i)} qt1 \} + \{ qt2 \xrightarrow{i} qt2' \} + \dots$
- $S + \{ qt1 \xrightarrow{Q} qt2 \xrightarrow{(i)} qt1' \xrightarrow{Q'} qt2' \} \implies$
 $S + \{ qt1' \xrightarrow{i} qt1 \} + \{ qt2 \xrightarrow{(i)} qt2' \} + \dots$

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
A Simple Example

```
fun id x = x in
  let y = id1 3q
      z = id2 4r
```



A Higher-Order Example

```
fun app f x = f x in
  let z = app1 (\y.y) 3q
```



Two Observations

- We are doing constraint copying
 - Notice the edge from *c* to *a* got "copied" to *q* to *y*
 - We didn't draw the transitive edge, but we could have
- This algorithm can be made demand-driven
 - We only need to worry about paths from constant qualifiers
 - Good implications for scalability in practice

CFL Reachability

- We're trying to find paths through the graph whose edges are a language in some grammar
 - Called the *CFL Reachability* problem
 - Computable in cubic time

Grammar for Matched Paths

$M ::= (i M)i$ for any i
 $| M M$
 $| d$ regular subtyping edge
 $|$ empty

- Also can include other paths, depending on application

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
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Global Variables

- Consider the following identity function

`fun id(x:int):int = z := x; !z`

- Here z is a global variable
- Typing of `id`, roughly speaking:




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Global Variables

- Suppose we instantiate and apply `id` to q inside of a function



- And then another function returns z
- Uh oh! $(1)2$ is not a valid flow path
 - But q may certainly reach d

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
Thou Shalt Not Quantify a Global Type (Qualifier) Variable

- We violated a basic rule of polymorphism
 - We generalized a variable free in the environment
 - In effect, we duplicated z at each instantiation
- Solution: Don't do that!

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Our Example Again



- We want anything flowing into z , on any path, to flow out in any way
 - Add a self-loop to z that consumes any mismatched parens

Typing Rules, Fixed

- Track unquantifiable vars at generalization

$$\begin{array}{c}
 qt1 = \text{fresh}(t1) \quad qt2 = \text{fresh}(t2) \\
 G, f: (qt1 \rightarrow^Q qt2, v), x:qt1 \dashv\vdash e : qt2' \quad qt2' \leq qt2 \\
 v = \text{free vars of } G \\
 \hline
 G \dashv\vdash \text{fun } f^Q(x:t1):t2 = e : (qt1 \rightarrow^Q qt2, v)
 \end{array}$$

Typing Rules, Fixed

- Add self-loops at instantiation

$$\begin{array}{c}
 (qt, v) = G(f) \quad qt' = \text{fresh}(qt) \quad qt \xrightarrow{)i} qt' \\
 v \xrightarrow{)i} v \quad v \xrightarrow{(i} v \\
 \hline
 G \dashv\vdash f_i : qt'
 \end{array}$$


Qualifier Constants

- Also use self-loops for qualifier constants

let taint () = tainted 42 in

let c = taint()

let d = taint()



Efficiency

- Constraint generation yields $O(n)$ constraints
 - Same as before
 - Important for scalability
- Context-free language reachability is $O(n^3)$
 - But a few tricks make it practical (not much slowdown in analysis times)
- For more details, see
 - Rehof + Fahndrich, POPL'01

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Type Qualifiers: The Icky Stuff in C

Introduction

- That's all the theory behind this system
 - More complicated system: flow-sensitive qualifiers
 - Not going to cover that here
- Suppose we want to apply this to a language like C
 - It's a little more complicated!

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Local Variables in C

- The first (easiest) problem: C doesn't use *ref*
 - It has *malloc* for memory on the heap
 - But local variables on the stack are also updateable:

```
void foo(int x) {
  int y;
  y = x + 3;
  y++;
  x = 42;
}
```
- The C types aren't quite enough
 - `3 : int`, but can't update 3!

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L-Types and R-Types

- C hides important information:
 - Variables behave different in l- and r-positions
 - l = left-hand-side of assignment, r = rhs
 - On lhs of assignment, *x* refers to *location x*
 - On rhs of assignment, *x* refers to *contents of location x*

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Mapping to ML-Style References

- Variables will have ref types:
 - $x : \text{ref}^Q \langle \text{contents type} \rangle$
 - Parameters as well, but r-types in fn sigs
- On rhs of assignment, add deref of variables

```
void foo(int x) {          foo(x:int):void =
    int y;                let x = ref x in
    y = x + 3;            let y = ref 0 in
    y++;                  y := (x) + 3;
    x = 42;               y := (y) + 1;
    g(&y);                 x := 42;
                          g(y)
}
```

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Multiple Files

- Most applications have multiple source code files
- If we do inference on one file without the others, won't get complete information:

```
extern int t;
x = t;
```

```
$tainted int t = 0;
```

- Problem: In left file, we're assuming *t* may have any qualifier (we make a fresh variable)

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Multiple Files: Solution #1

- Don't analyze programs with multiple files!
- Can use CIL merger from Nacula to turn a multi-file app into a single-file app
 - E.g., I have a merged version of the linux kernel, 470432 lines
- Problem: Want to present results to user
 - Hard to map information back to original source

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Multiple Files: Solution #2

- Make conservative assumptions about missing files
 - E.g., anything globally exposed may be **tainted**
- Problem: Very conservative
 - Going to be hard to infer useful types

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Multiple Files: Solution #3

- Give tool all files at same time
 - Whole-program analysis
- Include files that give types to library functions
 - In CQual, we have prelude.cq
- Unify (or just equate) types of globals
- Problem: Analysis really needs to scale


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Structures (or Records): Scalability Issues

- One problem: Recursion
 - Do we allow qualifiers on different levels to differ?

```
struct list {  
  int elt;  
  struct list *next;  
}
```


 - Our choice: no (we don't want to do shape analysis)

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Structures: Scalability Issues

- Natural design point: All instances of the same **struct** share the same qualifiers
- This is what we used to do
 - Worked pretty well, especially for format-string vulnerabilities
 - Scales well to large programs (linear in program size)
- Fell down for user/kernel pointers
 - Not precise enough

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Structures: Scalability Issues

- Second problem: Multiple Instances
 - Naïvely, each time we see
`struct inode x;`
we'd like to make a copy of the type `struct inode` with fresh qualifiers
 - Structure types in C programs are often long
 - `struct inode` in the Linux kernel has 41 fields!
 - Often contain lots of nested structs
 - This won't scale!

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
Multiple Structure Instances

- Instantiate `struct` types lazily
 - When we see
`struct inode x;`
we make an empty record type for `x` with a pointer to type `struct inode`
 - Each time we access a field `f` of `x`, we add fresh qualifiers for `f` to `x`'s type (if not already there)
 - When two instances of the same `struct` meet, we unify their records
 - This is a heuristic we've found is acceptable

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
Lazy Field Expansion



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Lazy Field Expansion




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
Lazy Field Expansion

a: x : a ref(b int) ...a,x...




Lazy Field Expansion

a: x : a ref(b int) b: y : c ref(d int)




Lazy Field Expansion

a: x : a ref(b int) b: y : c ref(d int)




Lazy Field Expansion

a: x : a ref(b int) b: y : c ref(d int)



Lazy Field Expansion



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Subtyping Under Pointer Types

- Recall we argued that an updateable reference behaves like an object with get and set operations

- Results in this rule:

$$\frac{Q \leq Q' \quad qt \leq qt' \quad qt' \leq qt}{\text{ref}^Q qt \leq \text{ref}^{Q'} qt'}$$

- What if we can't write through reference?

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Subtyping Under Pointer Types

- C has a type qualifier `const`
 - If you declare `const int *x`, then `*x = ...` not allowed
- So `const` pointers don't have "get" method
 - Can treat `ref` as covariant

$$\frac{Q \leq Q' \quad qt \leq qt' \quad \text{const} \leq Q'}{\text{ref}^Q qt \leq \text{ref}^{Q'} qt'}$$

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Subtyping Under Pointer Types

- Turns out this is very useful
 - We're tracking `taintedness` of strings
 - Many functions read strings without changing their contents
 - Lots of use of `const` + opportunity to add it

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Presenting Inference Results

- Type error = unsatisfiable constraints
 - E.g., path from tainted to untainted
- Heuristics for presenting "good" errors
 - Suppress derivative errors
 - $l \leq l_1 \leq \dots \leq l_n \leq x \leq u_1 \leq \dots \leq u_m \leq u$ where $l_i = u_j$
 - Suppress redundant errors
 - Only report one error for the above path
 - Suppress purely anonymous paths
 - Those that correspond to intermediate qualifier variables

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Type Casts

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Experiment: Format String Vulnerabilities

- Analyzed 10 popular unix daemon programs
 - Annotations shared across applications
 - One annotated header file for standard libraries
 - Includes annotations for polymorphism
 - Critical to practical usability
- Found several known vulnerabilities
 - Including ones we didn't know about
- User interface critical

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Results: Format String Vulnerabilities


Name	Warn	Bugs
identd-1.0.0	0	0
mingetty-0.9.4	0	0
bftpd-1.0.11	1	1
muh-2.05d	2	~2
cfengine-1.5.4	5	3
imapd-4.7c	0	0
ipopd-4.7c	0	0
mars_nwe-0.99	0	0
apache-1.3.12	0	0
openssh-2.3.0p1	0	0

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Experiment: User/kernel Vulnerabilities (Johnson + Wagner 04)

- In the Linux kernel, the kernel and user/mode programs share address space



- The top 1GB is reserved for the kernel
- When the kernel runs, it doesn't need to change VM mappings
 - Just enable access to top 1GB
 - When kernel returns, prevent access to top 1GB

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Tradeoffs of This Memory Model

- Pros:
 - Not a lot of overhead
 - Kernel has direct access to user space
- Cons:
 - Leaves the door open to attacks from untrusted users
 - A pain for programmers to put in checks

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An Attack

- Suppose we add two new system calls

```
int x;
void sys_setint(int *p) { memcpy(&x, p, sizeof(x)); }
void sys_getint(int *p) { memcpy(p, &x, sizeof(x)); }
```
- Suppose a user calls `getint(buf)`
 - Well-behaved program: `buf` points to user space
 - Malicious program: `buf` points to unmapped memory
 - Malicious program: `buf` points to kernel memory
 - We've just written to kernel space! Oops!

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Another Attack

- Can we compromise security with `setint(buf)?`
 - What if `buf` points to private kernel data?
 - E.g., file buffers
 - Result can be read with `getint`

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The Solution: `copy_from_user`, `copy_to_user`

- Our example should be written

```
int x;
void sys_setint(int *p) { copy_from_user(&x, p, sizeof(x)); }
void sys_getint(int *p) { copy_to_user(p, &x, sizeof(x)); }
```

- These perform the required safety checks
 - Return number of bytes that couldn't be copied
 - `from_user` pads destination with 0's if couldn't copy

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It's Easy to Forget These

- Pointers to kernel and user space look the same
 - That's part of the point of the design
- Linux 2.4.20 has 129 syscalls with pointers to user space
 - All 129 of those need to use `copy_from/to`
 - The `ioctl` implementation passes user pointers to device drivers (without sanitizing them first)
- The result: Hundreds of `copy_from/_to`
 - One (small) kernel version: 389 from, 428 to
 - And there's no checking

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User/Kernel Type Qualifiers

- We can use type qualifiers to distinguish the two kinds of pointers
 - `kernel` -- This pointer is under kernel control
 - `user` -- This pointer is under user control
- Subtyping `kernel < user`
 - It turns out `copy_from/copy_to` can accept pointers to kernel space where they expect pointers to user space

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Type Signatures

- We add signatures for the appropriate fns:

```
int copy_from_user(void *kernel to,
                  void *user from, int len)
int memcpy(void *kernel to,
           void *kernel from, int len)
int x;
void sys_setint(int *user p) { OK OK
  copy_from_user(&x, p, sizeof(x)); }
void sys_getint(int *user p) {
  memcpy(p, &x, sizeof(x)); }
Error
```

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Qualifiers and Type Structure

- Consider the following example:

```
void ioctl(void *user arg) {
    struct cmd { char *datap; } c;
    copy_from_user(&c, arg, sizeof(c));
    c.datap[0] = 0; // not a good idea
}
```
- The pointer `arg` comes from the user
 - So `datap` in `c` also comes from the user
 - We shouldn't dereference it without a check

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Well-Formedness Constraints

- Simpler example

```
char **user p;
```

 - Pointer `p` is under user control
 - Therefore so is `*p`
- We want a rule like:
 - In type `refuser(Q s)`, it must be that `Q ≤ user`
 - This is a *well-formedness* condition on types

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Well-Formedness Constraints

- As a type rule
$$\frac{|--wf(Q' s) \quad Q' \leq Q}{|--wf\ ref^Q(Q' s)}$$
 - We implicitly require all types to be well-formed
- But what about other qualifiers?
 - Not all qualifiers have these structural constraints
 - Or maybe other quals want `Q ≤ Q'`

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Well-Formedness Constraints

- Use conditional constraints
$$\frac{|--wf(Q' s) \quad Q \leq user \implies Q' \leq user}{|--wf\ ref^Q(Q' s)}$$
 - "If `Q` must be `user`, then `Q'` must be also"
- Specify on a per-qualifier level whether to generate this constraint
 - Not hard to add to constraint resolution

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Well-Formedness Constraints

- Similar constraints for `struct` types

For all i , $|--wf(Q_i s_i) \quad Q_i \leq user \implies Q_i \leq user$
 $|--wf struct^Q(Q_1 s_1, \dots, Q_n s_n)$

- Again, can specify this per-qualifier

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A Tricky Example

```
int copy_from_user(<kernel>, <user>, <size>);
int i2cdev_ioctl(struct inode *inode, struct file *file, unsigned cmd,
                unsigned long arg) {
    ...case I2C_RDWR:
        if (copy_from_user(&rdwr_arg,
                          (struct i2c_rdwr_ioctl_data *) arg,
                          sizeof(rdwr_arg)))
            return -EFAULT;
        for (i = 0; i < rdwr_arg.nmsgs; i++) {
            if (copy_from_user(rdwr_pa[i].buf,
                              rdwr_arg.msgs[i].buf,
                              rdwr_pa[i].len)) {
                res = -EFAULT; break;
            }
        }
    }
}
```

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A Tricky Example

```
int copy_from_user(<kernel>, <user>, <size>);
int i2cdev_ioctl(struct inode *inode, struct file *file, unsigned cmd,
                unsigned long arg) {
    ...case I2C_RDWR:
        if (copy_from_user(&rdwr_arg,
                          (struct i2c_rdwr_ioctl_data *) arg,
                          sizeof(rdwr_arg)))
            return -EFAULT;
        for (i = 0; i < rdwr_arg.nmsgs; i++) {
            if (copy_from_user(rdwr_pa[i].buf,
                              rdwr_arg.msgs[i].buf,
                              rdwr_pa[i].len)) {
                res = -EFAULT; break;
            }
        }
    }
}
```

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A Tricky Example

```
int copy_from_user(<kernel>, <user>, <size>);
int i2cdev_ioctl(struct inode *inode, struct file *file, unsigned cmd,
                unsigned long arg) {
    ...case I2C_RDWR:
        if (copy_from_user(&rdwr_arg,
                          (struct i2c_rdwr_ioctl_data *) arg,
                          sizeof(rdwr_arg)))
            return -EFAULT;
        for (i = 0; i < rdwr_arg.nmsgs; i++) {
            if (copy_from_user(rdwr_pa[i].buf,
                              rdwr_arg.msgs[i].buf,
                              rdwr_pa[i].len)) {
                res = -EFAULT; break;
            }
        }
    }
}
```

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A Tricky Example

```
int copy_from_user(<kernel>, <user>, <size>);
int i2cdev_ioctl(struct inode *inode, struct file *file, unsigned cmd,
                unsigned long arg) {
    ...case I2C_RDWR:
        if (copy_from_user(&rdwr_arg,
                          (struct i2c_rdwr_ioctl_data *) arg,
                          sizeof(rdwr_arg)))
            return -EFAULT;
        for (i = 0; i < rdwr_arg.nmsgs; i++) {
            if (copy_from_user(rdwr_pa[i].buf,
                              rdwr_arg.msgs[i].buf,
                              rdwr_pa[i].len)) {
                res = -EFAULT; break;
            }
        }
    }
}
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```

Annotations: "user" points to `arg`, "OK" points to `rdwr_arg`, "Bad" points to `rdwr_pa[i].buf`.

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Experimental Results

- Ran on two Linux kernels
 - 2.4.20 -- 11 bugs found
 - 2.4.23 -- 10 bugs found
- Needed to add 245 annotations
 - Copy_from/to, kmalloc, kfree, ...
 - All Linux syscalls take user args (221 calls)
 - Could have been done automatically (All begin with sys_)
- Ran both single file (unsound) and whole-kernel
 - Disabled subtyping for single file analysis

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More Detailed Results

- 2.4.20, full config, single file
 - 512 raw warnings, 275 unique, 7 exploitable bugs
 - Unique = combine msgs for user qual from same line
- 2.4.23, full config, single file
 - 571 raw warnings, 264 unique, 6 exploitable bugs
- 2.4.23, default config, single file
 - 171 raw warnings, 76 unique, 1 exploitable bug
- 2.4.23, default config, whole kernel
 - 227 raw warnings, 53 unique, 4 exploitable bugs

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Observations

- Quite a few false positives
 - Large code base magnifies false positive rate
- Several bugs persisted through a few kernels
 - 8 bugs found in 2.4.23 that persisted to 2.5.63
 - An unsound tool, MECA, found 2 of 8 bugs
 - ==> Soundness matters!

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Observations

- Of 11 bugs in 2.4.23...
 - 9 are in device drivers
 - Good place to look for bugs!
 - Note: errors found in "core" device drivers
 - (4 bugs in PCMCIA subsystem)
- Lots of churn between kernel versions
 - Between 2.4.20 and 2.4.23
 - 7 bugs fixed
 - 5 more introduced

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Conclusion

- Type qualifiers are specifications that...
 - Programmers will accept
 - Lightweight
 - Scale to large programs
 - Solve many different problems
- In the works: ccqual, jqual, Eclipse interface

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