

Modal Logic

Part III – Games!

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Recap of Lecture II

- ▶ Kripke semantics.
- ▶ Proof theory for modal logics.
- ▶ Extensions: the beautiful modal cube!

In this lecture: games!

- ▶ Validity games
- ▶ Provability games
- ▶ Modal games

Outline

Satisfiability games

From satisfiability to validity

Modal games

Group polarisation and modalities

Outline

Satisfiability games


From satisfiability to validity

Modal games

Group polarisation and modalities

Hintikka's semantic games

Formula $F = \left[a^- \vee (b^+ \wedge c^-) \right] \vee [a^+ \wedge b^-]$
Model $\mathcal{J} = \{a^+, b^-, c^-\}$



F is true over $\mathcal{J}$!



Proponent

F is false over $\mathcal{J}$!




Opponent

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Formula $F = \left[a^- \vee (b^+ \wedge c^-) \right] \vee \left[a^+ \wedge b^- \right]$

Model $\mathcal{J} = \{a^+, b^-, c^-\}$



at $F_1 \vee F_2$,
P chooses
between
 F_1 and F_2



at $F_1 \wedge F_2$,
O chooses
between
 F_1 and F_2



at $a^\pm$,
P wins iff
 $\mathcal{J} \models a^\pm$



at $a^\pm$,
O wins iff
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F is true over
 $\mathcal{J}$!






F is false over
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Hintikka's semantic games


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

Hintikka's semantic games

$$\text{Formula } F = [a^- \vee (b^+ \wedge c^-)] \vee [a^+ \wedge b^-]$$

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
P has a winning strategy:




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P has a winning strategy:



$\vee$ **P chooses**

$\wedge$ **O chooses**

$a^\pm$ **P wins iff**
 $\mathcal{J} \models a^\pm$

$a^\pm$ **O wins iff**
 $\mathcal{J} \not\models a^\pm$

P has a winning strategy in $S_{\mathcal{J}}^{\text{CL}}(F)$ iff
 $\mathcal{J} \models F$.

Outline

Satisfiability games

From satisfiability to validity

Modal games

Group polarisation and modalities

From semantic games to provability games

Can **P** play the game such that she wins in **every model**?



The provability game

$$\text{Formula } F = \left[a^- \vee (b^+ \wedge c^-) \right] \vee \left[a^+ \wedge (b^- \vee c^+) \right]$$



P chooses



O chooses



P wins in
 $a^\pm$ iff for every model $\mathcal{J}$,
 $\mathcal{J} \models a^\pm$



O wins otherwise



**P can create backup
copies:** at F , continue
with $F \parallel F$

The provability game

$$\text{Formula } F = \left[a^- \vee (b^+ \wedge c^-) \right] \vee \left[a^+ \wedge (b^- \vee c^+) \right]$$



P chooses



O chooses



P wins in
 $a_1^\pm \parallel \dots \parallel a_n^\pm$ iff for every
model $\mathcal{J}$, there is some i
with $\mathcal{J} \models a_i^\pm$



O wins otherwise



P can create backup copies: at

$F_1 \parallel \dots \parallel F_i \parallel \dots \parallel F_n$,

continue with

$F_1 \parallel \dots \parallel F_i \parallel F_i \parallel \dots \parallel F_n$




P is the scheduler


The provability game

$$[a^- \vee (b^+ \wedge c^-)] \vee [a^+ \wedge (b^- \vee c^+)]$$


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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
The provability game



Adequacy




From probability games to proofs



$$\begin{array}{c}
 \frac{a^- \parallel a^+}{a^- \vee (b^+ \wedge c^-) \parallel a^+} \quad \frac{\frac{b^+ \parallel b^-}{b^+ \parallel b^- \vee c^+} \quad \frac{c^- \parallel c^+}{c^- \parallel b^- \vee c^+}}{b^+ \wedge c^- \parallel b^- \vee c^+} \\
 \hline
 \frac{a^- \vee (b^+ \wedge c^-) \parallel a^+ \quad a^- \vee (b^+ \wedge c^-) \parallel b^- \vee c^+}{a^- \vee (b^+ \wedge c^-) \parallel a^+ \wedge (b^- \vee c^+)} \\
 \hline
 \frac{a^- \vee (b^+ \wedge c^-) \parallel [a^- \vee (b^+ \wedge c^-)] \vee [a^+ \wedge (b^- \vee c^+)]}{[a^- \vee (b^+ \wedge c^-)] \vee [a^+ \wedge (b^- \vee c^+)] \parallel [a^- \vee (b^+ \wedge c^-)] \vee [a^+ \wedge (b^- \vee c^+)]} \\
 \hline
 [a^- \vee (b^+ \wedge c^-)] \vee [a^+ \wedge (b^- \vee c^+)]
 \end{array}$$

Proof theory!



There is a **proof** of F iff F is **valid** in propositional classical logic!

Outline


Satisfiability games

From satisfiability to validity

Modal games

Group polarisation and modalities

How about modalities?




$\Box F \dots F$ is...

- ... necessary
- ... known
- ... obligatory
- ...



Playing with modalities

Formula $F = \Diamond(a^+ \wedge b^-)$ + model + world



 at $w: \Diamond F$,
P chooses an wRv
to continue with $v: F$

 at $w: \Box F$,
O chooses an wRv
to continue with $v: F$


 **P chooses**

 **O chooses**

 **P wins** iff
 $\mathcal{M}, w \models a^\pm$

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
O chooses



P wins iff
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


O wins iff
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
$\Box$ at $w: \Box F$,
O chooses an wRv
to continue with $v: F$

$\vee$ **P chooses**


$\wedge$ **O chooses**

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
$\Box$ at $w: \Box F$,
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Playing with modalities

$$\begin{array}{c}
 \frac{\mathcal{D} \parallel i: F_1}{\mathcal{D} \parallel i: F_1 \vee F_2} (\vee)_1 \qquad \frac{\mathcal{D} \parallel i: F_1 \quad \mathcal{D} \parallel i: F_2}{\mathcal{D} \parallel i: F_1 \wedge F_2} (\wedge) \qquad \frac{\mathcal{D} \parallel i: F \quad \mathcal{D} \parallel i: F}{\mathcal{D} \parallel i: F} (c) \qquad a_1^\pm \parallel \dots \parallel a_n^\pm \text{ (Axiom)} \\
 \qquad \qquad \qquad \dots \text{ winning}^* \\
 \\
 \frac{\mathcal{D} \parallel i: F_2}{\mathcal{D} \parallel i: F_1 \vee F_2} (\vee)_2 \\
 \\
 \frac{\mathcal{D} \parallel j: R^+(i, j) \wedge G}{\mathcal{D} \parallel i: \Diamond G} (\Diamond) \qquad \frac{\mathcal{D} \parallel j: R^-(i, j) \vee G}{\mathcal{D} \parallel i: \Box G} (\Box) \\
 \qquad \qquad \qquad \dots j \text{ is not in } \mathcal{D}, G
 \end{array}$$

*P-time checkable



at $i: \Diamond F$,
P chooses a j to
 continue with
 $j: R^+(i, j) \wedge F$



at $i: \Box F$,
O chooses a j
 to continue with
 $j: R^-(i, j) \vee F$

There is a proof of $i: F$ iff* F is valid in H.

* i does not appear in F

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Social network logic [Pedersen'24]

Social network: a graph where

- ▶ nodes = agents or groups of agents;
- ▶ arrows = social relation (such as friendship) or a communication channel.



Social network logic [Pedersen'24]

Social network: a graph where

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Social network logic: $\{\text{social network analysis}\} \cap \{\text{formal logic}\}$

- ▶ use logical methods in the explicit study of social networks;
- ▶ broaden our understanding of specific social phenomena.



Group polarisation

- ▶ Individuals in a group adopt **more extreme positions** after group discussions;
- ▶ **balance**: stable configurations of connections between agents;
- ▶ **modal logic**: models the evolution of opinions, preferences, or alliances.



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Positive-Negative Logic (PNL) [Xiong'17, Xiong, Ågotnes'19]:

- ▶ two distinct relations to model networks;
- ▶ agents can be related positively or negatively, but not both.

PNL Logic

Grammar:

$$F ::= p \mid \neg F \mid F_1 \wedge F_2 \mid F_1 \vee F_2 \mid \mid \Diamond F \mid \Diamond F \mid$$

- ▶ $\Diamond F$ holds for agent a whenever F holds for some a 's enemy;
- ▶ $\Diamond F$ holds for agent a whenever F holds for some a 's friend;

Grammar:

$$F ::= p \mid \neg F \mid F_1 \wedge F_2 \mid F_1 \vee F_2 \mid R^+(i,j) \mid R^-(i,j) \mid \Diamond F \mid \Diamond F \mid [A]F$$

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Model $\mathcal{M} = \langle A, R^+, R^-, V, g \rangle$:

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Model $\mathcal{M} = \langle A, R^+, R^-, V, g \rangle$:

- ▶ A is a set (of agents);
- ▶ $g : N \rightarrow A$ is the **denotation function** – gives names to agents;
- ▶ $R^+, R^- \subseteq A \times A$;
- ▶ $V : At \rightarrow \mathcal{P}(A)$.

Grammar:

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Model $\mathcal{M} = \langle A, R^+, R^-, V, g \rangle$:

- ▶ $(a, b) \in R^+$: agent a agrees with (is a **friend of**) agent b ;
- ▶ $(a, b) \in R^-$: agent a disagrees with (is an **enemy of**) agent b .

Grammar:

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- ▶ g is **surjective** (every agent has a name);
- ▶ R^+ is **reflexive**;
- ▶ R^+ and R^- are **symmetric**;
- ▶ these relations **do not overlap**.

Grammar:

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- ▶ g is **surjective** (every agent has a name);
- ▶ R^+ is **reflexive**;
- ▶ R^+ and R^- are **symmetric**; Optional axiom: **collectively connectedness**
- ▶ these relations **do not overlap**.

Grammar:

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
Model $\mathcal{M} = \langle A, R^+, R^-, V, g \rangle$:

- ▶ $(a, b) \in R^+$: agent a agrees with (is a **friend of**) agent b ;
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Let $a = g(i)$. Then:

$$\begin{array}{ll} \mathcal{M}, a \Vdash \Diamond^\pm F & \text{iff there is } j \in N \text{ such that } \mathcal{M}, g(j) \Vdash R^\pm(i,j) \text{ and } \mathcal{M}, g(j) \Vdash F \\ \mathcal{M}, a \Vdash [A]F & \text{iff } \mathcal{M}, g(j) \Vdash F, \text{ for all } j \in N. \end{array}$$


Agreement and disagreement relations



► $\mathcal{M}_1$: I have a friend who does not believe in p : $\mathcal{M}_1, I \Vdash \Diamond \neg p$;


►

Agreement and disagreement relations




- ▶ $\mathcal{M}_1$: I have a friend who does not believe in p : $\mathcal{M}_1, I \Vdash \Diamond \neg p$;
- ▶ $\mathcal{M}_2$: All *my* enemies do not believe in p : $\mathcal{M}_2, I \Vdash \Box \neg p$;

Agreement and disagreement relations



- ▶ $\mathcal{M}_1$: I have a friend who does not believe in p : $\mathcal{M}_1, I \Vdash \Diamond \neg p$;
- ▶ $\mathcal{M}_2$: All *my* enemies do not believe in p : $\mathcal{M}_2, I \Vdash \Box \neg p$;
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- ▶ $\mathcal{M}_4$: Everybody has a friend where p : $\mathcal{M}_4, a \models [A] \Diamond p$ for any agent a .

The need for nominals

Extending Hintikka dialogue games to modal logic is straightforward:

- ▶ current roles of the **players**;
- ▶ current **formula** F ;
- ▶ current world w in the **model**.

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- ▶ Propositional logic: semantic information is required only at the **final stage** to determine the winner.
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
From now on:

- ▶ internalise the nominals: identify an agent a with its **nominal** i .

Semantic Game (truth in a model)[Freiman, Olarte, Pimentel, Fermüller'24]

Satisfiability


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
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P: Proponent




O: Opponent

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P: Proponent



O: Opponent

Semantic Game



Conjunction $P, i : F \wedge G$

Semantic Game



Conjunction

$P, i : F \wedge G$

YOU

$P, i : F$

$P, i : G$

Semantic Game



Conjunction $O, i : F \wedge G$

Semantic Game



Conjunction

$O, i : F \wedge G$

ME



$O, i : F$

Semantic Game



Conjunction

$O, i : F \wedge G$

ME



$O, i : G$

Semantic Game



Diamond $P, i : \Diamond^\pm F$

Semantic Game



Diamond $P, i : \Diamond^\pm F$

No successor $\leadsto$ You win

Semantic Game



Diamond $P, i : \Diamond^\pm F$

ME



$P, j : F$

Semantic Game



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Semantic Game



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
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Semantic Game





Diamond $O, i : \Diamond^\pm F$

YOU






An example: Balance (stable configurations)



$$\begin{aligned} & ((\Diamond\Diamond p \vee \Diamond\Diamond p) \rightarrow \Diamond p) \wedge \\ & ((\Diamond\Diamond p \vee \Diamond\Diamond p) \rightarrow \Diamond p) \end{aligned} \quad (4B)$$





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
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Dynamics: playing the game!

$$\begin{array}{l}
 [\checkmark, Y] : P @ a : (\neg (\Diamond \Diamond p \vee \Diamond \Diamond p) \vee \Diamond p) \wedge \neg (\Diamond \Diamond p \vee \Diamond \Diamond p) \vee \Diamond p \\
 \begin{array}{l}
 \text{---} [\checkmark, I] : P @ a : \neg (\Diamond \Diamond p \vee \Diamond \Diamond p) \vee \Diamond p \\
 \quad \text{---} [\checkmark, I] : P @ a : \Diamond p \\
 \quad \quad \text{---} [\checkmark, I] : P @ b : p \\
 \text{---} [\checkmark, I] : P @ a : \neg (\Diamond \Diamond p \vee \Diamond \Diamond p) \vee \Diamond p \\
 \quad \text{---} [\checkmark, I] : P @ a : \neg (\Diamond \Diamond p \vee \Diamond \Diamond p) \\
 \quad \quad \text{---} [\checkmark, Y] : 0 @ a : \Diamond \Diamond p \vee \Diamond \Diamond p \\
 \quad \quad \begin{array}{l}
 \text{---} [\checkmark, Y] : 0 @ a : \Diamond \Diamond p \\
 \quad \quad \text{---} [\checkmark, Y] : 0 @ a : \Diamond p \\
 \quad \quad \quad \text{---} [\checkmark, Y] : 0 @ c : p \\
 \quad \quad \text{---} [\checkmark, Y] : 0 @ b : \Diamond p \\
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 \quad \quad \text{---} [\checkmark, Y] : 0 @ c : \Diamond p \\
 \quad \quad \quad \text{---} [\checkmark, Y] : 0 @ c : p
 \end{array}
 \end{array}
 \end{array}$$



$$((\Diamond \Diamond p \vee \Diamond \Diamond p) \rightarrow \Diamond p) \wedge ((\Diamond \Diamond p \vee \Diamond \Diamond p) \rightarrow \Diamond p) \quad (4B)$$

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
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$((\Diamond \Diamond p \vee \Diamond \Diamond p) \rightarrow \Diamond p) \wedge$
 $((\Diamond \Diamond p \vee \Diamond \Diamond p) \rightarrow \Diamond p)$ (4B)


Dynamics: playing the game!

$\text{--- } [\checkmark, I] : P @ a : \neg (\Diamond \Diamond p \vee \Diamond \Diamond p) \vee \Diamond p$
 $\text{--- } [\checkmark, I] : P @ a : \neg (\Diamond \Diamond p \vee \Diamond \Diamond p)$



$$\begin{aligned}
 & ((\Diamond \Diamond p \vee \Diamond \Diamond p) \rightarrow \Diamond p) \wedge \\
 & ((\Diamond \Diamond p \vee \Diamond \Diamond p) \rightarrow \Diamond p)
 \end{aligned}
 \tag{4B}$$

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
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
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
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Dynamics: playing the game!

I win!

$$\begin{array}{l} \vdash [\checkmark, Y] : 0 @ c : \oplus p \\ \quad \vdash [\checkmark, Y] : 0 @ c : p \end{array}$$


$$\begin{array}{l} ((\oplus \oplus p \vee \oplus \oplus p) \rightarrow \oplus p) \wedge \\ ((\oplus \oplus p \vee \oplus \oplus p) \rightarrow \oplus p) \end{array} \quad (4B)$$

Semantic Game $G_{\mathcal{M}}(g)$


Strategy for **Me** = subtree σ of the associated game tree such that:

1. $g \in \sigma$,
2. if $h \in \sigma$ is a node labelled **Y**, then all children of h are in σ ,
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
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

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



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Adequacy of semantic games:

- ▶ **I** have a winning strategy for $G_{\mathcal{M}}(P, i : F)$ iff $\mathcal{M}, a \models F$.
- ▶ **You** have a winning strategy for $G_{\mathcal{M}}(P, i : F)$ iff $\mathcal{M}, a \not\models F$.

What about validity?

There is **no** uniform strategy for winning $P, i : p \vee \neg p$.

What about validity?


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Validity/disjunctive game:

- ▶ Multiset of game states.
- ▶ The ability to **duplicate** states.
- ▶ The model is relevant 'only' in **elementary states**.

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The provability game $DG(P, i : F)$ can be thought as:

► Me and You

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Adequacy - provability games:

I have a winning strategy in $DG(D)$ iff for every **PNL**-model $\mathcal{M}$, there is some $g \in D$ such that I have a winning strategy in $G_{\mathcal{M}}(g)$.

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Corollary. F is **PNL**-valid iff I have a winning strategy in $DG(P, i : [A]F)$.

From games to proofs

As you may imagine:

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$$O, i_1 : F_1; \dots; O, i_n : F_n; \quad P, j_1 : G_1; \dots; P, j_m : G_m$$

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$$i_1 : F_1, \dots, i_n : F_n \longrightarrow j_1 : G_1, \dots, j_m : G_m$$

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Proof system $\leadsto$ **Me** scheduling game states and choosing moves in **I**-states.

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Provability $\leadsto$ *validity*.

Important:

Formal relationship between **elementary game states** and **logical axioms**.

Some rules

$$\frac{\Gamma \longrightarrow R^{\pm}(i,j), \Delta \quad \Gamma \longrightarrow j : F, \Delta}{\Gamma \longrightarrow i : \diamond^{\pm} F, \Delta} (R_{\diamond^{\pm}}) \quad \frac{\Gamma, j : F \longrightarrow \Delta}{\Gamma, i : [A]F \longrightarrow \Delta} (L_{[A]})$$

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$$\frac{}{\Gamma \longrightarrow \Delta, R^{+}(i,i)} \text{ref}^{+} \quad \frac{}{\Gamma \longrightarrow \Delta, R^{+}(i,j), R^{-}(i,j)} \text{cc}$$

Some rules

$$\frac{\Gamma \longrightarrow R^\pm(i, j), \Delta \quad \Gamma \longrightarrow j : F, \Delta}{\Gamma \longrightarrow i : \Diamond^\pm F, \Delta} (R_{\Diamond^\pm}) \quad \frac{\Gamma, j : F \longrightarrow \Delta}{\Gamma, i : [A]F \longrightarrow \Delta} (L_{[A]})$$

$$\frac{}{\Gamma \longrightarrow \Delta, R^+(i, i)} \text{ref}^+ \quad \frac{}{\Gamma \longrightarrow \Delta, R^+(i, j), R^-(i, j)} \text{cc}$$

Collective connectedness:

$$(\boxplus p \rightarrow [A]p) \vee (\boxminus p \rightarrow [A]p)$$

$$\frac{\frac{}{\longrightarrow j : p, R^+(i, j), R^-(i, j)} \text{cc} \quad \frac{}{\longrightarrow j : p, j : \neg p, R^+(i, j)} R_{\neg, \text{init}}}{\longrightarrow j : p, i : \Diamond \neg p, R^+(i, j)} R_{\Diamond} \quad \frac{}{\longrightarrow j : p, j : \neg p, i : \Diamond \neg p} R_{\neg, \text{init}}}{\longrightarrow j : p, i : \Diamond \neg p, i : \Diamond \neg p} R_{\Diamond}$$

$$\frac{\frac{}{\longrightarrow j : p, i : \Diamond \neg p, i : \Diamond \neg p} R_{[A]} \quad \frac{}{\longrightarrow i : [A]p, i : \Diamond \neg p, i : \Diamond \neg p} R_{[A]}}{\longrightarrow i : (\boxplus p \rightarrow [A]p) \vee (\boxminus p \rightarrow [A]p)} R_{\vee}, R_w, R_{\neg}, L_{\neg}$$

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- ▶ Correspondence between winning innocent strategies in games played on Hyland-Ong arenas and proofs in **modal constructive logics**.

End of Part III

Thank you!!!

Obrigada!!!

Gracias!!!



References

1. [Notes on game semantics](#) by Pierre-Louis Curien, 2019.
2. [Playing with modalities](#) by Elaine Pimentel, Carlos Olarte, Timo Lang, Robert Freiman, Chris Fermüller, LIPIcs, Volume 326, CSL 2025.