



Modern Separation Logic — Derek Dreyer

Lecture 4 - Invariants & Concurrency
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1 From Persistency to Invariants

Continued from lecture 3... Regarding the program :

$$\begin{aligned} \text{MutBitImpl} \triangleq & \text{ let } x = \text{new } 0 \text{ in} \\ & \langle \lambda \langle \rangle . x \leftarrow 1 - !x, \\ & \lambda \langle \rangle . \text{let } y = !x \text{ in} \\ & \quad \text{if } y = 0 \text{ then false} \\ & \quad \text{else if } y = 1 \text{ then true} \\ & \quad \text{else assert false} \rangle \end{aligned}$$
$$\text{assert } e \triangleq \text{if } e \text{ then } \langle \rangle \text{else } 4242$$

We want to prove:

$$\{\text{True}\} \text{MutBitImpl} \{v. \text{MutBit}(v)\}$$

where

$$\begin{aligned} \text{MutBit}(v) \triangleq & \{\text{True}\}(\pi_1 v) \langle \rangle \{w. w = \langle \rangle\} \\ & \wedge \{\text{True}\}(\pi_2 v) \langle \rangle \{w. w = \text{true} \vee w = \text{false}\} \end{aligned}$$

We internalized Hoare triples as an Iris proposition

$$\{P\} e \{v. Q(v)\} \triangleq \Box(P \multimap \text{wp } e \{v. Q(v)\}),$$

using the persistence modality $\Box$ so that a specification, once proved, could be freely duplicated and reused.

How can we duplicate the ownership of resource $\ell \mapsto 0$ into the two clause of the $\wedge$ in *MutBit*, where ℓ is the location of x ? After allocating the reference ℓ , our context holds $\ell \mapsto 0$. To prove the (persistent) triple for $\lambda\langle \rangle. x \leftarrow 1 - !x$, we would need to give up $\ell \mapsto 0$ underneath a $\Box$, but $\ell \mapsto 0$ is not a persistent proposition, so it cannot survive being put “inside a box”. Wrapping a non-persistent resource in $\Box$ does not launder it into something duplicable; it is simply not provable. This is the real problem left over from last time, and persistency alone does not solve it. What we need is a way to make the *ownership itself* shared and duplicable, while still allowing us to temporarily and exclusively use what it protects. This is exactly what *invariants* give us.

2 Invariants

2.1 State Propositions

Not every proposition is safe to share as an invariant, in particular, an invariant must not secretly smuggle in more separation-logic machinery (like another invariant, or a weakest precondition) that could break the bookkeeping we are about to set up. The propositions we are allowed to put into an invariant are drawn from a restricted fragment, the *state propositions*.

2.2 Invariant Assertions

Given a state proposition F and a *namespace* N (a name used to keep invariants apart, more on this below), we write $\boxed{F}^N$ for the assertion that F is maintained as a *shared* invariant. Owning $\boxed{F}^N$ does not mean we personally own F : it means the ambient program, as a whole, guarantees that F holds at all times (except for brief windows we will discuss shortly). No single thread, and no single part of our proof, gets to hold F exclusively anymore, ownership has become collective.

For *MutBitImpl*, we no longer try to keep $\ell \mapsto 0$ to ourselves. Instead we agree, once and for all, to a protocol for how ℓ may be used: it always stores either 0 or 1.

$$I_{\text{MutBit}} := \boxed{\exists n \in \{0, 1\}. \ell \mapsto n}^N$$

2.3 Invariant Rules

$$\begin{array}{c} \text{INVPERS} \\ \boxed{F}^N \vdash \Box \boxed{F}^N \end{array} \quad \begin{array}{c} \text{INVALLOC} \\ \frac{P * \boxed{F}^N \vdash \text{wp}_E e \{v. Q(v)\}}{P * F \vdash \text{wp}_E e \{v. Q(v)\}} \end{array} \quad \begin{array}{c} \text{INVOPEN} \\ \frac{P * F \vdash \text{wp}_{E \setminus N} e \{v. F * Q(v)\} \quad N \subseteq E}{P * \boxed{F}^N \vdash \text{wp}_E e \{v. Q(v)\}} \end{array}$$

INVPERS says that owning knowledge *that* F is maintained as an invariant is itself persistent: this

knowledge can be freely duplicated and handed out to as many parts of the proof (or, later, as many threads) as we like, even though F itself need not be persistent.

INVALLOC says we may convert local, exclusive ownership of a state proposition F into the persistent, shared knowledge $\boxed{F}^N$. We trade away the right to unilaterally read or modify F , but in exchange we get to share it everywhere.

INVOPEN is the interesting rule. If we own $\boxed{F}^N$, we may *temporarily* get our hands on F during the execution of e , but we must hand back F (or a re-established version of it) in the postcondition. The reason we must restore it is that other parts of the proof (and, once we add concurrency, other threads) are relying on F continuing to hold whenever they look at it.

2.4 Namespaces and Masks

If we could open the same invariant twice, the logic would be unsound: two copies of $\ell \mapsto n$ from the same invariant would let us derive **False** via POINTSTOSEP. To prevent this, every invariant carries a *namespace* N , and every weakest precondition carries a *mask* E recording which namespaces are still available to be opened ($E = \top$, the full mask, when omitted). Opening $\boxed{F}^N$ requires $N \subseteq E$, and removes N from the mask for the duration of e ; the mask is restored once the invariant is closed again. In the Iris Proof Mode this bookkeeping is entirely automatic: opening an invariant is a single tactic that checks the namespace side-condition and updates the mask for you.

2.5 Proof of MutBitImpl

We prove $\{\text{True}\} \text{MutBitImpl } \{v. \text{MutBit}(v)\}$.

Both branches are proved underneath $\square$, and both only ever needed the shared, persistent I_{MutBit} , never exclusive ownership of ℓ . Thus the argument goes through for $\lambda\langle\rangle. x \leftarrow 1 - !x$ and **get** arbitrarily many times.

2.6 Rocq Mechanization

The proof above corresponds closely to the following Rocq/Iris Proof Mode script.

```
(** Setup **)
Definition hoare (P : iProp) (e : expr) (Phi : val -> iProp) : iProp :=
  square (P -* WP e {{ Phi }}).

(* MutBit example *)
Definition assert : val :=
```

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```
lambda: "x", if: "x" then #() else #42 #42.
```

```
Definition MutBitImpl : expr :=
  let: "x" := ref #0 in
  (lambda: <>, "x" <- #1 - !"x",
   lambda: <>, let: "y" := !"x" in
     if: "y" = #0 then #false
     else if: "y" = #1 then #true
     else assert #false).
```

```
Definition MutBitSpec v : iProp :=
  {{ True }} (Fst v) #() {{ w, [| w = #() |] }} *
  {{ True }} (Snd v) #() {{ w, [| w = #true |] \ / [| w = #false |] }}.
```

```
Definition mutbitN := nroot .@ "mutbit".
```

```
Lemma MutBitImpl_proof :
```

```
|- {{ True }} MutBitImpl {{ v, MutBitSpec v }}.
```

```
Proof.
```

```
iIntros "!> _". unfold MutBitImpl.
wp_alloc loc as "H1". wp_pures.
iApply (inv_alloc mutbitN (loc |-> #0 \ / loc |-> #1) with "[H1]").
{ eauto with iFrame. }
iIntros "#HInv".
iApply wp_value. unfold MutBitSpec. iSplit.
- iIntros "!> _". wp_pures.
  iApply (inv_open with "HInv"); first set_solver.
  iIntros "[H1 | H1]".
  + wp_load. wp_store. iApply wp_value. eauto with iFrame.
  + wp_load. wp_store. iApply wp_value. eauto with iFrame.
- iIntros "!> _". wp_pures.
  iApply (inv_open with "HInv"); first set_solver.
  iIntros "[H1 | H1]".
  + wp_load. wp_pures. iApply wp_value. eauto with iFrame.
  + wp_load. wp_pures. iApply wp_value. eauto with iFrame.
```

```
Qed.
```

A few lines are worth matching up to the rules above:

- `wp_alloc` corresponds to the `NEW` rule from Lecture 2, giving us `loc ↦ 0`.
- `inv_alloc mutbitN (...) with "[H1]"` is exactly `INVALLOC`: we hand over our exclusive resource `H1` and get back persistent knowledge of the invariant, named `HInv`.

- The `iIntros "!"` pattern discharges a $\square$ goal, it is how we *prove* a persistent proposition once its underlying content has been established (this is what lets `HInv` move into the persistent context, marked with `#`).
- Because `HInv` is persistent, it survives `iSplit` unchanged: it is available, in full, in *both* resulting subgoals ($\lambda\langle\rangle.x \leftarrow 1 - !x$ and `get`). This is `INV_PERS` / duplicability in action.
- `inv_open with "HInv"` is `INV_OPEN`; the side-condition `set_solver` discharges the namespace check $N \subseteq E$ automatically.
- The two branches `[H1 | H1]` are the case split on $\ell \mapsto 0 \vee \ell \mapsto 1$, and are symmetric, matching the $\lambda\langle\rangle.x \leftarrow 1 - !x$ / `get` cases above; `eauto with iFrame` both restores the invariant and discharges the postcondition.

3 Concurrency

So far, our language has had no way to run two pieces of code “at the same time”. We now add that ability.

3.1 Extending the Language

Terms $e ::= \dots \mid \text{CAS}(e_1, e_2, e_3) \mid \text{fork}\{e\}$

- `fork{e}` spawns a new thread executing e , and immediately returns `()` in the thread that called it. In `fork{e1}; e2`, after `fork{e1}`, both e_1 and e_2 are running.
- `CAS(e1, e2, e3)` (“compare-and-set”) evaluates e_1, e_2, e_3 to a location ℓ and values v, w . If ℓ *currently* stores v , it atomically updates ℓ to store w and returns `true`; otherwise it leaves ℓ untouched and returns `false`.

Crucially, `CAS` performs its check-and-update as a *single, indivisible* step. This is what makes it useful as a synchronization primitive: no other thread can run “in between” the comparison and the update.

3.2 Operational Semantics

$$\frac{h(\ell) = v \quad v \text{ comparable}}{(\text{CAS}(\ell, v, w), h) \rightsquigarrow_b (\text{true}, h[\ell \mapsto w])} \qquad \frac{h(\ell) \neq v \quad v \text{ comparable}}{(\text{CAS}(\ell, v, w), h) \rightsquigarrow_b (\text{false}, h)}$$

$$\overline{(K[\text{fork}\{e\}], h) \rightsquigarrow (K[], h, [e])}$$

Two new base reductions for **CAS** mirror the two possible outcomes above. Forking off a thread extends the contextual step with a list of newly spawned expressions, which then get folded into a thread pool; the thread pool may reduce *any* thread at each step, so any interleaving of threads is possible.

3.3 Concurrent Separation Logic Rules

$$\begin{array}{c}
\text{SuccCAS} \\
\frac{v_1 \text{ comparable}}{\ell \mapsto v_1 * (\ell \mapsto v_2 * Q(\text{true})) \vdash \text{wp } \text{CAS}(\ell, v_1, v_2) \{v. Q(v)\}} \\
\\
\text{FailCAS} \\
\frac{v_1 \neq v_3 \quad v_1 \text{ comparable}}{\ell \mapsto v_3 * (\ell \mapsto v_3 * Q(\text{false})) \vdash \text{wp } \text{CAS}(\ell, v_1, v_2) \{v. Q(v)\}} \\
\\
\text{FORK} \\
\frac{}{\text{wp } e \{ _ . \text{True} \} * Q() \vdash \text{wp } \text{fork}\{e\} \{v. Q(v)\}}
\end{array}$$

SuccCAS and FailCAS correspond exactly to the two operational rules above: to run **CAS**(ℓ, v_1, v_2) we need to already know what ℓ currently stores, and depending on whether it matches v_1 , we either get to update our ownership to v_2 (and **true**), or keep it as-is (and **false**). FORK says that to justify forking off e , we only need e to be safe to run on its own (with an uninteresting postcondition, **True**), we do not need to know anything about *when* it finishes, since we get $Q()$ for the parent immediately, before e has even necessarily started running.

3.4 Invariants Must Be Opened Atomically

Concurrency breaks INVOPEN as stated above. With other threads running, we can no longer assume that e in $\text{wp } e \{v. Q(v)\}$ executes from start to finish without interruption: other threads may run at arbitrary points *during* e , and if we have left an invariant broken while e is still in progress, those other threads could observe an inconsistent state. We fix this by only allowing invariants to be opened around *atomic* expressions, expressions that reduce to a value in a single step, such as **CAS**(ℓ, v, w), $\ell \leftarrow v$, or $! \ell$:

$$\begin{array}{c}
\text{INVOPEN (CONCURRENT)} \\
\frac{P * F \vdash \text{wp}_{E \setminus N} e \{v. F * Q(v)\} \quad N \subseteq E \quad e \text{ atomic}}{P * \boxed{F}^N \vdash \text{wp}_E e \{v. Q(v)\}}
\end{array}$$

Because an atomic expression cannot be interrupted, it is safe to momentarily break the invariant around it, no other thread ever gets to look “inside” that single step.

3.5 Example: A Spin Lock

We implement the classic “hello world” of concurrent separation logic: a spin lock, represented as a single memory cell holding a boolean (`true` while held, `false` while free).

```

mklock() := new false
trylock(l) := CAS(l, false, true)
lock(l) := if trylock(l) then () else lock(l)
unlock(l) := l ← false

```

`trylock` makes a single attempt to atomically flip the lock from free to held, reporting whether it succeeded. `lock` calls `trylock` in a loop (“spins”) until it succeeds. `unlock` simply writes `false` directly, no CAS is needed, because by the specification below, only the thread currently holding the lock is ever in a position to call `unlock`, so there is no race to guard against.

3.5.1 Specification

We introduce a predicate $\text{lock}(\ell, P)$, read “ ℓ is a lock protecting the resource P ”, and aim to prove:

$$\begin{aligned}
\{P\} \text{mklock}() & \{v. \exists \ell. v = \ell * \text{lock}(\ell, P)\} \\
\{\text{lock}(\ell, P)\} \text{lock}(\ell) & \{.. P\} \\
\{\text{lock}(\ell, P)\} \text{trylock}(\ell) & \{v. (v = \text{false}) \vee (v = \text{true} * P)\} \\
\{\text{lock}(\ell, P) * P\} \text{unlock}(\ell) & \{.. \text{True}\}
\end{aligned}$$

Intuitively, $\text{lock}(\ell, P)$ behaves like an invariant that is tied to program discipline: `lock` “opens” it, handing us P , and `unlock` “closes” it again, taking P back. We define it directly as an invariant:

$$\text{lock}(\ell, P) := \boxed{\ell \mapsto \text{true} \vee (\ell \mapsto \text{false} * P)}^{\mathcal{N}}$$

Either the lock is currently held ($\ell \mapsto \text{true}$, and P is out in the world with whoever holds it), or it is free ($\ell \mapsto \text{false}$), in which case the invariant itself is holding P in escrow for the next thread to acquire it. Since $\text{lock}(\ell, P)$ is defined as an invariant, INVPERs gives us, for free, that it is persistent:

$$\text{lock}(\ell, P) \vdash \Box \text{lock}(\ell, P),$$

which is exactly what lets a single lock be shared and used by arbitrarily many threads.

3.5.2 Proof Sketch of `lock`

Unfolding one call, our goal becomes

$$\text{lock}(\ell, P) \vdash \text{wp } (\text{if } \text{trylock}(\ell) \text{ then } () \text{ else } \text{lock}(\ell)) \{ \neg P \}.$$

Binding on the `CAS` inside `trylock` and opening `lock(\ell, P)` (a single `CAS` step is atomic, so this is allowed) splits the proof into the two disjuncts of the invariant:

- **Case** $\ell \mapsto \text{true}$ and
- **Case** $\ell \mapsto \text{false} * P$

To be continued ...