

# Compositional Compiler Verification & Secure Compilation


Amal Ahmed

Northeastern University

# Compiler Correctness

= semantics-preserving compilation

$s \rightsquigarrow t$   
↑  
compiles to



$s \approx t$   
↑  
same behavior

# Compiler Verification

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One of the “big problems” of computer science

- since *McCarthy and Painter 1967*:  
*Correctness of a Compiler for Arithmetic Expressions*
- see *Dave 2003: Compiler Verification: A Bibliography*

# Compiler Verification since 2006...

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*Leroy '06 : Formal certification of a compiler back-end or:  
programming a compiler with a proof assistant.*

CompCert

*Lochbihler '10 : Verifying a compiler for Java threads.*

*Myreen '10 : Verified just-in-time compiler on x86.*

*Sevcik et al.'11 : Relaxed-memory concurrency and  
verified compilation.*

CompCertTSO

*Zhao et al.'13 : Formal verification of SSA-based  
optimizations for LLVM*



*Kumar et al.'14 : CakeML: A verified implementation  
of ML*



⋮

# Why CompCert had such impact...

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
- Demonstrated that realistic verified compilers are both *feasible* and bring *tangible benefits*

The striking thing about our CompCert results is that the middle-end bugs we found in all other compilers are absent. As of early 2011, the under-development version of CompCert is the only compiler we have tested for which Csmith cannot find wrong-code errors. This is not for lack of trying: we have devoted about six CPU-years to the task. The apparent unbreakability of CompCert supports a strong argument that developing compiler optimizations within a proof framework, where safety checks are explicit and machine-checked, has tangible benefits for compiler users. (Yang et al. PLDI 2011)

# Why CompCert had such impact...

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- Demonstrated that realistic verified compilers are both *feasible* and bring *tangible benefits* [Yang et al. PLDI'11]
- Provided a *proof architecture* for others to follow/build on
  - CompCert memory model, uniform across passes
  - proof using simulations



*Not verified yet*  
 (\*) the parser is formally verified

*Formally verified*

# Why CompCert had such impact...

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

- Demonstrated that realistic verified compilers are both *feasible* and bring *tangible benefits* [Yang et al. PLDI'11]
- Provided a *proof architecture* for others to follow/build on
  - CompCert memory model, uniform across passes
  - proof using simulations

*But the simplicity of the proof architecture comes at a price...*

# Problem: Whole-Program Assumption

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Correct compilation guarantee only applies to **whole** programs!




*CompCert's ... “formal guarantees of semantics preservation apply only to whole programs that have been compiled as a whole by [the] CompCert C [compiler]” (Leroy 2014)*

# Problem: Whole-Program Assumption

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
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# Problem: Whole-Program Assumption


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Correct compilation guarantee only applies to **whole** programs!



# “Compositional” Compiler Verification

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## This Lecture...

- why specifying compositional compiler correctness theorems is hard
- survey recent results
- generic CCC theorem to guide future compiler correctness theorems
- lessons for formalizing **linking** & verifying **multi-pass** compilers

# Compiler Correctness

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$$s \rightsquigarrow t \implies s \approx t$$

↑  
expressed how?

# Whole-Program Compiler Correctness

---

$$P_s \rightsquigarrow P_t \implies P_s \approx P_t$$

↑  
expressed how?  
“closed” simulations

## CompCert

$$\begin{array}{ccccccc} P_s & \mapsto & \dots & \mapsto & P_s^i & \mapsto & P_s^{i+1} & \mapsto & \dots \\ \text{\color{red} |} & & & & \text{\color{red} |} & & \text{\color{red} |} & & \\ R & & & & R & & R & & \\ P_t & \mapsto & \dots & \mapsto & P_t^j & \mapsto & P_t^{j+n} & \mapsto & \dots \end{array}$$

# Whole-Program Compiler Correctness

---

$$P_s \rightsquigarrow P_t \implies P_t \sqsubseteq P_s$$

↑  
behavior refinement

$$\forall n. P_t \xrightarrow{T_t}^n P'_t \implies$$

$$\exists m. P_s \xrightarrow{T_s}^m P'_s \wedge T_t \simeq T_s$$

# Correct Compilation of Components?

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
$e_s \approx e_t$

↑

expressed how?

# Correct Compilation of Components?


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
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# “Compositional” Compiler Correctness

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

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# “Compositional” Compiler Correctness

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$$e_s \approx e_t$$

expressed how?

Produced by


- same compiler,
- diff compiler for  $S$ ,
- compiler for diff lang  $R$ ,
- $R$  that's **very** diff from  $S$ ?

Is behavior of  $e'_t$  expressible in  $S$ ?

# “Compositional” Compiler Correctness

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If we want to verify realistic compilers...



$$e_s \approx e_T$$



Definition should:

- permit **linking** with target code of arbitrary provenance
- support verification of **multi-pass** compilers


# Next

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- Survey of “compositional” compiler correctness results
  - how to express  $e_S \approx e_T$
- How does the choice affect:
  - what we can **link** with (*horizontal compositionality*)
  - how we check if some  $e'_t$  is okay to link with
  - effort required to prove *transitivity* for **multi-pass** compilers (*vertical compositionality*)
  - effort required to have confidence in theorem statement


# What we can link with

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# What we can link with

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


# Approach: Separate Compilation

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SepCompCert

*[Kang et al. '16]*




# Approach: Separate Compilation


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SepCompCert


[Kang et al. '16]



*Level A correctness:  
exactly same compiler*




*Level B correctness:  
can omit some intra-language  
(RTL) optimizations*




# What we can link with

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# Approach: Cross-Language Relations

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


Cross-language relation

$$e_s \approx e_T$$

# Approach: Cross-Language Relations

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Cross-language relation

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
Compiling ML-like langs:

*Logical relations*

- [Benton-Hur ICFP'09]
- [Hur-Dreyer POPL'11]

# Approach: Cross-Language Relations

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Cross-language relation

$$e_s \approx e_T$$


Compiling ML-like langs:

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- **No transitivity!**

# Approach: Cross-Language Relations

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Cross-language relation

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Compiling ML-like langs:

*Logical relations*


- **No transitivity!**

*Parametric inter-language simulations (PILS)*

- [Neis et al. ICFP'15]

# Approach: Cross-Language Relations

---



Cross-language relation

$$e_s \approx e_T$$

Compiling ML-like langs:

*Logical relations*

- No transitivity!

*Parametric inter-language simulations (PILS)*

- Prove transitivity, but requires effort!

# Cross-Language Relation (Pilsner)

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$$x : \tau' \vdash e_s : \tau \rightsquigarrow e_t \implies x : \tau' \vdash e_s \simeq e_t : \tau$$


cross-language relation

$$\forall e'_s, e'_t. \vdash e'_s \simeq e'_t : \tau' \implies \vdash e_s[e'_s/x] \simeq e_t[e'_t/x] : \tau$$

# Cross-Language Relation (Pilsner)


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Have  $x : \tau' \vdash e_s \simeq e_t : \tau$



# Cross-Language Relation (Pilsner)

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
Have  $x : \tau' \vdash e_s \simeq e_t : \tau$

*Does the compiler  
correctness theorem  
permit linking with  $e'_t$ ?*

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
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
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
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
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


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$\vdash e'_s \simeq e'_t : \tau'$

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
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$\therefore \vdash e_s[e'_s/x] \simeq e_t[e'_t/x] : \tau$

# Cross-Language Relation (Pilsner)

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
- Need to come up with  $e'_s$   
-- not feasible in practice!
- Cannot link with  $e'_t$   
whose behavior cannot  
be expressed in source.

Horizontal  
Compositionality

Linking


# Horizontal Compositionality

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


# Linking

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


# Source-Independent Linking




# What we can link with

---



# Correct Compilation of Components?


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$e_s \approx e_T$   
↑  
expressed how?

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
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
expressed how?

Need a semantics  
of source-target  
interoperability:

- *interaction semantics*
- *source-target multi-language*

# What we can link with

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


# Approach: Interaction Semantics

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## Compositional CompCert *[Stewart et al. POPL'15]*

- Language-independent linking


$$\begin{array}{l} \text{Semantics } (G \ C \ M : \text{Type}) : \text{Type} \triangleq \\ \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{initial\_core} \quad : \quad G \rightarrow \mathcal{V} \rightarrow \text{list } \mathcal{V} \rightarrow \text{option } C \\ \text{at\_external} \quad : \quad C \rightarrow \text{option } (\mathcal{F} \times \text{list } \mathcal{V}) \\ \text{after\_external} : \quad \text{option } \mathcal{V} \rightarrow C \rightarrow \text{option } C \\ \text{halted} \quad \quad : \quad C \rightarrow \text{option } \mathcal{V} \\ \text{corestep} \quad \quad : \quad G \rightarrow C \rightarrow M \rightarrow C \rightarrow M \rightarrow \text{Prop} \end{array} \right. \end{array}$$

**Figure 2.** Interaction semantics interface. The types  $G$  (global environment),  $C$  (core state), and  $M$  (memory) are parameters to the interface.  $\mathcal{F}$  is the type of external function identifiers.  $\mathcal{V}$  is the type of CompCert values.

# Approach: Interaction Semantics

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Compositional CompCert *[Stewart et al. POPL'15]*

- Language-independent linking
- **Structured simulation:** support rely-guarantee relationship between the different languages while retaining vertical compositionality

# Approach: Interaction Semantics

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Compositional CompCert *[Stewart et al. POPL'15]*

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- **Structured simulation:** support rely-guarantee relationship between the different languages while retaining vertical compositionality
  - **transitivity relies on compiler passes performing restricted set of memory transformations**

# Approach: Interaction Semantics


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## Compositional CompCert *[Stewart et al. POPL'15]*

- **Language-independent linking**
  - uniform CompCert memory model across all languages
  - not clear how to scale to richer source langs (e.g., ML), compilers with different source/target memory models
- **Structured simulation:** support rely-guarantee relationship between the different languages while retaining vertical compositionality
  - transitivity relies on compiler passes performing restricted set of memory transformations


# What we can link with

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# Approach: Source-Target Multi-lang.

[Perconti-Ahmed ESOP'14]




Specify semantics  
of source-target  
interoperability:

$ST e_t$      $TS e_s$

*Multi-language semantics:  
a la Matthews-Findler '07*

# Approach: Source-Target Multi-lang.

[Perconti-Ahmed ESOP'14]



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
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*Multi-language semantics:  
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# Approach: Source-Target Multi-lang.

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[Perconti-Ahmed ESOP'14]




$$\mathcal{TS}(e_s (ST e'_t)) \approx^{ctx} e_t e'_t$$

# Approach: Source-Target Multi-lang.

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


[Perconti-Ahmed ESOP'14]



$$e_s \approx e_T \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} e_s \approx^{ctx} \mathcal{ST} e_T$$


# Multi-Language Semantics Approach

---




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
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


# Multi-Language Semantics Approach


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# Multi-Language Semantics Approach




## Compiler Correctness



# Multi-Lang. Approach: Multi-pass ✓

---

## Compiler Correctness




$$e_S \approx^{ctx} \mathcal{SI} e_I$$

$$e_I \approx^{ctx} \mathcal{IT} e_T$$

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## Compiler Correctness



$$e_S \approx^{ctx} \mathcal{SI}e_I$$




$$\mathcal{SI}e_I \approx^{ctx} \mathcal{SI}(\mathcal{IT}e_T)$$



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

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## Compiler Correctness





# Multi-Lang. Approach: Linking ✓

---




# Multi-Lang. Approach: Linking ✓

---



# Compiler Correctness: F to TAL

---



# Combined language **FCAT**

[Perconti-Ahmed ESOP'14]

[Patterson et al. PLDI'17]

- Boundaries mediate between

$$\tau \& \tau^{\mathcal{C}} \quad \tau \& \tau^{\mathcal{A}} \quad \tau \& \tau^{\mathcal{T}}$$

- Operational semantics


$$CF^{\tau}e \mapsto^* CF^{\tau}v \mapsto v$$

$$\tau FCe \mapsto^* \tau FCv \mapsto v$$

- Boundary cancellation

$$\tau FCCF^{\tau}e \approx^{ctx} e : \tau$$

$$CF^{\tau} \tau FCe \approx^{ctx} e : \tau^{\mathcal{C}}$$



# Interoperability: **F** and **C**

---

$$\mathcal{CF}^{\text{int}}(\mathbf{n}) \mapsto \mathbf{n}$$

$$\text{int}\mathcal{FC}(\mathbf{n}) \mapsto \mathbf{n}$$

# Interoperability: **F** and **C**

---


$$(\tau \rightarrow \tau')^{\mathbf{C}} = \exists \beta. \langle ((\beta, \tau^{\mathbf{C}}) \rightarrow \tau'^{\mathbf{C}}), \beta \rangle$$

$$\mathcal{CF}^{\tau \rightarrow \tau'} \mathbf{v} \mapsto \mathbf{pack} \langle \mathbf{unit}, \langle \mathbf{v}, () \rangle \rangle \text{ as } \exists \beta. \langle ((\beta, \tau^{\mathbf{C}}) \rightarrow \tau'^{\mathbf{C}}), \beta \rangle$$

$$\text{where } \mathbf{v} = \lambda(\mathbf{z} : \mathbf{unit}, \mathbf{x} : \tau^{\mathbf{C}}). \mathcal{CF}^{\tau'} (\mathbf{v}^{\tau} \mathcal{FC} \mathbf{x})$$

$$\tau \rightarrow \tau' \mathcal{FC} \mathbf{v} \mapsto \lambda(\mathbf{x} : \tau). \tau' \mathcal{FC} (\mathbf{unpack} \langle \beta, \mathbf{y} \rangle = \mathbf{v} \\ \text{in } \pi_1(\mathbf{y}) \pi_2(\mathbf{y}) \mathcal{CF}^{\tau} \mathbf{x})$$

# Challenges




F+C: Interoperability semantics with type abstraction in both languages

C+A: Interoperability when compiler pass allocates code & tuples on heap, e.g.,  $AC\langle v_1, v_2 \rangle$

A+T: What is  $e$ ? What is  $v$ ?  
How to define contextual equiv. for TAL components?  
How to define logical relation?

# Challenges




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How to define logical relation?

# What is a component in TAL?

---

$$e : \mathcal{T} \rightsquigarrow e$$

$e$



# What is a component in TAL?

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$e : \mathcal{T} \rightsquigarrow e$


basic block = instruction sequence

$e$



$e ::= (I, H)$


Heap with basic blocks



# Equivalence of components in TAL?

---


$$e : \mathcal{T} \rightsquigarrow e$$



# Equivalence of components in TAL?

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
$$e : \mathcal{T} \rightsquigarrow e$$



# Equivalence of components in TAL?

---

$$e : \mathcal{T} \rightsquigarrow e$$



*central challenge:* interoperability between  
high-level (direct-style) language &  
assembly (continuation style)


**FunTAL:** Reasonably Mixing a Functional Language  
with Assembly [*Patterson et al. PLDI'17*]

# CompCompCert vs. Multi-language

Transitivity	structured simulation	all passes use multi-lang $\approx^{ctx}$
Check okay-to-link-with	satisfies CompCert memory model	satisfies expected type (translation of source type)
Requires uniform memory model across compiler IRs	yes	no
Allows linking with behavior inexpressible in S	no	yes

# Proving Transitivity

---




**Vertical  
Compositionality**

**Transitivity**




# Vertical Compositionality

# Vertical Compositionality



# Transitivity

*CompCompCert & Multi-lang*



# Horizontal Compositionality

*Pilsner*  
*Neis et al.'15*

# *Source-Independent Linking*

*Compositional CompCert*  
*Stewart et al.'15*

*Multi-language ST*  
*Perconti-Ahmed'14*

# Vertical Compositionality

*Pilsner*  
*Neis et al.'15*

# Transitivity

*Compositional CompCert*  
*Stewart et al.'15*

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# To Understand if Theorem is Correct...

---

*Pilsner*  
*Neis et al.'15*

- source-target PLS

*Compositional CompCert*  
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- interaction semantics  
& structured simulations

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Is there a generic CCC theorem?

# Generic CCC Theorem?

---




$e_s \approx e_t$

↑

expressed how?

# Generic CCC Theorem?



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# Generic CCC Theorem?

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
$e'_t, \varphi \in$

$\mathcal{L}$  ← linking set


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# Generic CCC Theorem?

---




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
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
# Generic CCC Theorem?




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
# Generic CCC Theorem?



# Generic CCC Theorem



# Generic CCC Theorem



...and “lift” is inverse of “compile” on compiler output

# Generic CCC Theorem (Formally)

---

$$\exists \hat{\uparrow}. \forall e_S \in S. \forall (e_T, \varphi) \in \mathcal{L}.$$

$$e_T \sqsupseteq_T C_T^S(e_S) \sqsubseteq_{\hat{S}} \hat{\uparrow}(e_T, \varphi) \sqsupseteq_S e_S$$

...and “lift” is inverse of “compile” on compiler output

$$\forall (e_T, \varphi) \in \mathcal{L}. \forall e_S.$$

$$\begin{aligned} & (\forall c_T. c_T \sqsupseteq_T e_T \sqsubseteq_T c_T \sqsupseteq_T C_T^S(e_S)) \implies \\ & (\forall c_S. c_S \sqsupseteq_{\hat{S}} \hat{\uparrow}(e_T, \varphi) \sqsubseteq_S c_S \sqsupseteq_S e_S) \end{aligned}$$

The Next 700 Compiler Correctness Theorems (Functional Pearl)  
 [Patterson-Ahmed, ICFP 2019]

# CCC Properties

---

Implies **whole-program compiler correctness & separate compilation correctness**

Can be instantiated with different formalisms...

# CCC Properties

---

Implies **whole-program compiler correctness & separate compilation correctness**

Can be instantiated with different formalisms...

## Pilsner

$\mathcal{L}$   $\{(e_T, \varphi) \mid \varphi = \text{source component } e_S \text{ \& proof that } e_S \simeq e_T\}$

$\hat{S}$  unchanged source language  $S$

$\hat{S} \bowtie_S$  unchanged source language linking

$\uparrow(\cdot)$   $\uparrow(e_T, (e_S, \_)) = e_S$

# CCC Properties

---

Implies **whole-program compiler correctness & separate compilation correctness**

Can be instantiated with different formalisms...

## Multi-language ST

$\mathcal{L}$   $\{(e_T, \_) \mid \text{where } e_T \text{ is any target component}\}$

$\hat{S}$  source-target multi-language ST

$\hat{S} \bowtie_S e \quad ST \bowtie_{ST} e_S$

$\uparrow(\cdot) \quad \uparrow(e_T, \_) = \mathcal{ST}(e_T)$

# CCC Properties

---

Implies **whole-program compiler correctness & separate compilation correctness**

Can be instantiated with different formalisms...

## Compositional CompCert

$\mathcal{L}$   $\{(e_T, \_) \mid \text{where } e_T \text{ is any target component} \}$

$\widehat{S}$  semantics that embeds source and target, equipped with interaction semantics

$\widehat{S} \bowtie_S$  adding another module to combined semantics

$\uparrow(\cdot)$   $\uparrow(e_T, \_) = e_T$

# Benefits of CCC for the Next 700...

---

- Sheds light on pros & cons of compiler correctness formalisms
- Is a compositional compiler correctness theorem right? Instantiate CCC with your compiler correctness formalism & show that CCC follows as a corollary
- What's needed for better vertical compositionality / easier transitivity? ...

# Vertical Compositionality for Free

---

$\text{CCC}(S, I)$  and  $\text{CCC}(I, T) \implies \text{CCC}(S, T)$

when  $\uparrow_{ST} = \uparrow_{SI} \circ \uparrow_{IT}$

i.e., when **lift**  $\uparrow$  is a **back-translation** that maps every  $e_T \in \mathcal{L}$  to some  $e_S$

*Bonus of vertical comp:* can verify different passes using different formalisms to instantiate CCC

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
*Bonus of vertical comp:* can verify different passes using different formalisms to instantiate CCC

**Fully abstract compilers have such back-translations!**

# Fully Abstract Compilers

---

preserve equivalence




- ensure a compiled component does not interact with any target behavior that is inexpressible in  $S$ 
  - *this guarantees programmer can reason at source level*

# Fully Abstract Compilers

---

preserve equivalence




- ensure a compiled component does not interact with any target behavior that is inexpressible in  $S$ 
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- Do we want to link with behavior inexpressible in  $S$ ?  
Or do we want fully abstract compilers?

# Fully Abstract Compilers

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preserve equivalence



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  - *this guarantees programmer can reason at source level*
- Do we want to link with behavior inexpressible in  $S$ ?  
Or do we want fully abstract compilers?

**We want both!**

**Stepping Back...**

# Current State of PL Design

---

ML

Rust

Java

Target

# Current State of PL Design

---

ML

Rust

Java

*Language specifications are incomplete!  
Don't account for linking*

Target

# Current State of PL Design

---

*escape  
hatches*

ML  
C FFI

Rust  
unsafe

Java  
JNI

*Language specifications are incomplete!  
Don't account for linking*

Target

**The Way Forward...**

# Rethink PL Design with *Linking Types*

---

*escape  
hatches*

ML  
C FFI

Rust  
unsafe

Java  
JNI

# Rethink PL Design with *Linking Types*

---

*escape  
hatches*



Design **linking types** extensions that support safe interoperability with other languages

Linking Types for Multi-Language Software:  
Have Your Cake and Eat it Too  
[Patterson-Ahmed SNAPL'17]

# PL Design, Linking Types


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Only need linking types extensions to interact with behavior inexpressible in your language

# PL Design, Linking Types


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# PL Design, Linking Types


---



Only need linking types extensions to interact with behavior inexpressible in your language

# PL Design, Linking Types

---



*Type-preserving  
fully abstract  
compilers*



**Richly Typed Target**

# Linking Types

---

- Allow programmers to **reason in *almost* their own source language**, even when building multi-language software
- Allow compilers to be **fully abstract (and vertically compositional)**, yet support multi-language linking

Linking Types for Multi-Language Software:  
Have Your Cake and Eat it Too  
[Patterson-Ahmed SNAPL'17]

# Final Thoughts on Correct Compilation

---

- CompCert started a renaissance in compiler verification
  - major advances in mechanized proof
- Next challenge: Compositional Compiler Correctness
  - that applies to world of multi-language software
  - but **source-independent linking** and **vertical compositionality** are at odds
  - generic CCC theorem sheds light on current/future results

# Secure Compilation

## References & Future Directions

Formal Approaches to Secure Compilation:  
A Survey of Fully Abstract Compilation  
*[Patrignani--Ahmed-Clarke, ACM Computing Surveys 2019]*

# Challenge: Proving Full Abstraction

Suppose  $\Gamma \vdash e_1 : \tau \rightsquigarrow e_1$  and  $\Gamma \vdash e_2 : \tau \rightsquigarrow e_2$


Given:

$$\Gamma \vdash e_1 \approx_S^{ctx} e_2 : \tau$$

No  $C_S$  can distinguish  $e_1, e_2$

Show:

Given arbitrary  $C_T$  it cannot distinguish  $e_1, e_2$


$$\Gamma^+ \vdash e_1 \approx_T^{ctx} e_2 : \tau^+$$

Need to be able to “back-translate”  $C_T$  to an equivalent  $C_S$

# Challenge: Back-translation

- I. **If target is not more expressive than source**, use the same language: back-translation can be avoided in lieu of *wrappers* between  $\tau$  and  $\tau^+$ 
  - Closure conversion: System F with recursive types  
*[Ahmed-Blume ICFP'08]*
  - $f^*$  (STLC with refs, exceptions) to  $js^*$  (encoding of JavaScript in  $f^*$ ) *[Fournet et al. POPL'13]*

# Challenge: Back-translation

## 2. If target is more expressive than source

(a) Both **terminating**: use back-translation by partial evaluation

- Equivalence-preserving CPS from STLC to System F  
*[Ahmed-Blume ICFP'11]*
- Noninterference for Free (DCC to  $F_\omega$ )  
*[Bowman-Ahmed ICFP'15]*

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Observation: if source lang. has recursive types,  
can write interpreter for target lang. in source lang.

# Fully Abstract Closure Conversion

Source: STLC +  $\mu$  types

*[New et al. ICFP'16]*

Target: System F +  $\exists$  types +  $\mu$  types + **exceptions**


**First full abstraction result where target has exceptions but source does not.**

Earlier work, due to lack of sufficiently powerful back-translation techniques, added target features to source.

Proof technique: **Universal Embedding**

- Untyped embedding of target in source
- Mediate between strongly typed source and untyped back-translation

# Dynamic Secure Compilation



# Dynamic Secure Compilation

- I. Cryptographically enforced: concurrent, distributed langs.
  - Join calculus to Sjoin with crypto primitives, preserves and reflect weak bisimulation [Abadi et al. S&P'99, POPL'00, I&C'02]
  - Pi-calculus to Spi-calculus [Bugliesi and Giunti, POPL'07]
  - F# with session types to F# with crypto primitives [Corin et al., J. Comp. Security'08]
  - Distributed WHILE lang. with security levels to WHILE with crypto and distributed threads [Fournet et al, CCS'09]
  - TINYLINKS distributed language to F7 (ML w. refinement types), preserves data and control integrity [Baltopoulos and Gordon, TLDI'09]

# Dynamic Secure Compilation

## 2. Dynamic Checks / Runtime Monitoring

- STLC with recursion to untyped lambda-calc, proved fully abstract using *approximate back-translation*. Types erased and replaced w. dynamic checks. [Devriese et al. POPL'16]
- $f^*$  (STLC with refs, exceptions) to  $js^*$  (encoding of JavaScript in  $f^*$ ). Defensive wrappers perform dynamic type checks on untyped  $js^*$  [Fournet et al. POPL'13]
- Lambda-calc to VHDL digital circuits, run-time monitors check that external code respects expected communication protocol [Ghica and Al-Zobaidi ICE'12]

# Dynamic Secure Compilation

## 3. Memory Protection Techniques

### (a) Address space layout randomization (ASLR)

- STLC w. abstract memory, to target with concrete memory; show probabilistic full abstraction for large memory [*Abadi-Plotkin TISSEC'12*]
- Added dynamic alloc, h.o. refs, call/cc, testing hash of reference, to target with probref to reverse hash [*Jagadeesan et al. CSF'11*]

# Dynamic Secure Compilation

## 3. Memory Protection Techniques

- (b) Protected Module Architectures (PMAs) (e.g., Intel SGX) protected memory with code and data sections, and unprotected memory
- Secure compilation of an OO language (with dynamic allocation, exceptions, inner classes) to PMA; proved fully abstract using trace semantics. Objects allocated in secure memory partition [Patrignani et al. TOPLAS'15]

# Dynamic Secure Compilation

## 3. Memory Protection Techniques

(c) **PUMP Machine** architecture tracks meta-data, registers and memory locations have tags, checked during execution

- Secure compartmentalizing compiler with mutually distrustful compartments that can be compromised by attacker. OO lang to RISC with micro policies  
*[Juglaret et al. 2015]*

# Dynamic Secure Compilation

## 4. Capability Machines


- C to CHERI-like capability machine: give calling convention that enforces well-bracketed control-flow and encapsulation of stack frames using local capabilities (subsequent work: linear capabilities); proved using logical relation [Skorstengaard et al. ESOP'18, POPL'19]

# Secure Compilation: Open Problems

# Secure Compilation: Open Problems

1. **Need languages / DSLs that allow programmers to easily express security intent.**
  - Compilers need to know programmer intent so they can *preserve* that intent (e.g., FaCT, a DSL for constant-time programming [*Cauligi et al. SecDev'17*])
2. **Performant secure compilers**
  - Static enforcement avoids performance overhead, could run on stock hardware; need richly typed compiler IRs
  - Dynamic enforcement when code from static/dynamic and safe/unsafe languages interoperates (e.g., h/w support)
  - Better integration of static and dynamic enforcement...

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# Secure Compilation: Open Problems

3. **Preserve (weaker) security properties than contextual equiv.**
  - Full abstraction may preserve too many incidental/unimportant equivalences and has high overhead for dynamic enforcement
4. **Security against side-channel attacks**
  - Requires reasoning about side channels in source language, which is cumbersome. Can DSLs help?
  - *Correctness-Security Gap in Compiler Optimizations [D'Silva et al. LangSec'15]*. Make compilers aware of programmers' security intent to take into account for optimizations.

# Secure Compilation: Open Problems

5. **Cryptographically enforced secure compilation**
  - e.g., Obliv-C ensures memory-trace obliviousness using garbled circuits, but no formal proof that it is secure
6. **Concurrency** (beyond message-passing, targeting untyped multi-threaded assembly)
7. **Easier proof techniques and reusable proof frameworks** (trace-based techniques, back-translation, logical relations, bisimulation)

# Final Thoughts

It's an exciting time to be working on secure compilation!

- Numerous advances in the last decade, in PL/formal methods and systems/security.
- For performant secure compilers, will need to integrate static and dynamic enforcement techniques, and provide programmers with better languages for communicating their security intent to compilers.

